Doe v. Brown University, 43 F.4th 195

John Doe (Black male) and Jane Doe (white female) had a brief sexual encounter; their accounts diverged about who was aggressive. Jane filed a complaint; John’s request to file a counter-complaint was discouraged by a dean.
Brown’s Student Conduct Board found John responsible for non-consensual sexual contact and imposed a deferred suspension; Jane appealed but the sanction stood. Later, a separate student (Sally) submitted a complaint that led Brown to treat John as a danger and temporarily remove him from campus.
John experienced severe psychological distress, sought emergency counseling, and made a suicide attempt; following hospitalization, Brown officials met with him the same day, threatened multiple disciplinary consequences, and pressured him into taking a year-long voluntary medical leave.
John’s readmission was initially denied, then granted after supplemental materials; Brown later modified a mutual no-contact order into a unilateral one against John.
John sued asserting (inter alia) Title IX selective-enforcement (gender), race-discrimination claims (§ 1981, Title VI, RICRA), and Rhode Island intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment for Brown on all claims; the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of federal claims but reversed as to IIED and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Title IX selective enforcement (gender)	Brown pursued complaints against John (male) while neglecting his allegations against Jane; comparator and statistical evidence show gender bias	Brown treated matters for non-discriminatory reasons (prior finding of responsibility, legitimate procedural differences); disparate complainant demographics explain male-heavy enforcement	Affirmed: plaintiff failed to show sufficiently comparable treatment or evidence of gender-based intent
Race discrimination (§ 1981, Title VI, RICRA)	Brown’s cumulative, zealous, and procedural misconduct was motivated by racial animus against John	Brown’s actions were driven by complaints from Jane and Sally; no direct evidence of racial animus and no showing that stated reasons were a pretext	Affirmed: no admissible evidence of discriminatory intent or pretext sufficient for trial
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (Rhode Island tort)	Post-hospital meeting where officials—despite knowing John’s suicide risk and a doctor’s warning—coerced him with threats of charges and housing removal caused severe, diagnosable psychological harm	Officials were exercising permissible disciplinary rights; warning about consequences is not IIED even if distressing	Reversed: triable issues exist on extreme/outrageous conduct, intent/recklessness, causation, and severity; remanded for trial

Brader v. Biogen Inc., 983 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2020) (summary judgment standard; view facts for nonmovant)
Dartmouth Rev. v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989) (comparator test for disparate treatment)
Goodman v. Bowdoin Coll., 380 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2004) (proof of discriminatory intent required for § 1981 and Title VI claims)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for showing pretext)
Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849 (R.I. 1998) (Rhode Island IIED standard and "extreme and outrageous" requirement)
Gross v. Pare, 185 A.3d 1242 (R.I. 2018) (elements of IIED under Rhode Island law)
Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1991) (example where coercive insurer conduct presented jury question on IIED)
Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501 (1st Cir. 2005) (actor exercising legal rights not liable for IIED absent conduct beyond permissible insistence)