505 F.Supp.3d 65
D.R.I.2020Background
- John Doe, an African American Brown student and Division I lacrosse player, was accused by Jane Doe of nonconsensual sexual contact after a September 2013 encounter; Brown’s Student Conduct Board found John responsible for nonconsensual physical contact and alcohol violations and imposed deferred suspension and a mutual no-contact order (MNCO).
- Jane did not face discipline; John did not file a formal complaint against Jane and testified he was satisfied with the outcome and did not appeal.
- In May 2014 a separate complaint from Sally Roe prompted an interim separation notice for John; Brown later closed the Sally investigation for lack of cooperation and allowed John to return to campus.
- John suffered significant mental-health crises (including a suicide attempt in October 2014), took a medical leave for 2014–15, was later readmitted, returned to campus, and graduated in 2018.
- John sued Brown raising 12 counts (Title IX hostile environment, erroneous outcome/selective enforcement, Title VI/§1981 race claims, RICRA, IIED, breach of contract, etc.); after motions to dismiss some counts, Brown moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims.
- The district court granted Brown’s motion in full and dismissed all remaining counts, finding insufficient evidence of actionable gender- or race-based discrimination, IIED, or contractual breach.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title IX — hostile environment (Counts I & II) | Jane’s alleged physical conduct, subsequent rumors, MNCO breaches and Brown’s response created a severe, pervasive, objectively offensive hostile educational environment that deprived John of educational benefits. | Brown argues the alleged incidents are isolated/non-gendered, John suffered no deprivation tied to gender discrimination, and Brown’s responses were not clearly unreasonable. | Summary judgment for Brown — plaintiff failed to show severe/pervasive gender-based harassment or deprivation of educational benefits. |
| Title IX — selective enforcement (Count IV) | Brown selectively enforces disciplinary rules against men accused by women but not women accused by men; Jane and John are similarly situated comparators. | Brown contends no reasonable comparator exists; John’s counterclaims were defensive and came second. | Summary judgment for Brown — no similarly situated comparator (Haidak reasoning). |
| Race discrimination under Title VI and §1981 (Counts V & XII) | Brown’s actions (including alleged racially charged comment and disciplinary decisions) were motivated by race and caused disparate treatment. | Brown offers nondiscriminatory reasons (procedural choices, policy updates, safety concerns); no evidence links actions to race. | Summary judgment for Brown — plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case and produced only speculation of racial intent. |
| IIED (Count IX) | Brown’s conduct (including alleged racial remark, pressure at meetings, and investigation handling) was extreme, outrageous, and caused severe emotional distress (suicide attempt, leave). | Brown denies the alleged racial remark and argues its conduct was not extreme/atrocious; medical leave decision was plaintiff’s/clinician’s. | Summary judgment for Brown — insufficient evidence of extreme/outrageous conduct causally linked to severe distress. |
| Breach of contract / covenant of good faith (Counts X & XI) | Interim separation and investigative handling breached Brown’s contractual obligations and implied covenant, harming John. | Brown contends separation was reasonable based on complainant’s concerns, was temporary, vacated, and caused no material contractual harm. | Summary judgment for Brown — no material breach; covenant claim fails with contract claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (establishes deliberate-indifference framework for peer-on-peer sexual harassment causing deprivation of educational benefits)
- Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2007) (applies Davis standard in higher-education context)
- Trustees of Boston College v. Doe, 892 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018) (discusses disciplinary-proceeding Title IX claims: erroneous outcome and selective enforcement)
- Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (framework for erroneous-outcome/selective-enforcement Title IX claims)
- Haidak v. University of Massachusetts–Amherst, 933 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2019) (holds defensive, second-in-time accusations are not similarly situated for selective-enforcement comparator analysis)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (limits school liability absent actual knowledge and deliberate indifference in certain Title IX contexts)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for disparate-treatment claims)
- Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (clarifies burden-shifting framework and employer/university rebuttal burden)
- Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American–Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (but-for causation requirement for §1981 claims)
- Medina–Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff relies on conclusory allegations and speculation)