Doe v. Boy Scouts of America Corp.
147 A.3d 104
| Conn. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff (John Doe) sued Boy Scouts of America (BSA) after sexual abuse by a patrol leader (Hepp) during overnight scouting activities in the 1970s, alleging negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a CUTPA claim.
- At trial plaintiff presented evidence of unsupervised overnight camping, BSA’s ineligible volunteer files documenting reports of misconduct, and expert testimony linking the abuse to severe, ongoing psychological injuries.
- Defendant requested a jury instruction based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (duty to guard against third‑party intentional misconduct and factors from comment (f)); the trial court declined and instead gave a standard negligence instruction and an instruction on superseding cause.
- Jury returned verdict for plaintiff: $4 million for negligence and $3 million for negligent infliction of emotional distress (total $7 million); trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial or remittitur.
- Majority opinion remanded for new trial (concluding omission of § 302B instruction was improper and not harmless); Justice Eveleigh (joined by Justice McDonald) concurred in most parts but dissented on remand — arguing the omission was harmless and that damages were not excessive, urging affirmance except on CUTPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did trial court err by refusing § 302B instruction on foreseeability/duty to guard against third‑party intentional misconduct? | BSA had duty because its conduct (promoting overnight patrol camping and controlling training/records) created opportunities and increased risk of abuse. | Jury should have been instructed to consider § 302B factors (known character, temptation/opportunity, gravity of harm, burden of precautions, and possibility others would prevent conduct). | Trial court’s omission was improper per majority; Eveleigh, J., would treat omission as harmless on this record. |
| If omission was error, must court remand without harmless‑error inquiry? | N/A (plaintiff defends verdict) | N/A (defendant seeks reversal/new trial) | Majority says remand generally appropriate when improper instruction and cannot know if verdict would differ; Justice Eveleigh insists harmless error analysis is required and would find error harmless here. |
| Were the jury’s compensatory damages ($7M) excessive or duplicative? | Awards supported by testimony and expert linking abuse to long‑term psychiatric injury and substance abuse; general negligence and NIED are distinct. | Amount shocks the conscience, and $4M negligence award duplicates $3M NIED award—should be remitted. | Eveleigh: verdict not excessive or duplicative; trial court did not abuse discretion in denying remittitur; would affirm damages (except adjust for CUTPA). Majority did not decide excessiveness due to remand. |
| Did plaintiff prove causation (defendant’s negligence proximately caused injuries)? | Evidence that BSA’s policies, secrecy about ineligible volunteers, and promoted activities created foreseeable risk; abuse was substantial factor in harms. | No evidence BSA’s program posed greater risk than general public; thus no special duty or causation. | Both majority and Eveleigh conclude plaintiff made out prima facie case that BSA’s conduct increased risk and that causation was established; Eveleigh uses this to support harmless‑error conclusion and to affirm judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Allison v. Manetta, 284 Conn. 389 (Conn. 2007) (framework for harmless‑error analysis for instructional impropriety)
- McDermott v. State, 316 Conn. 601 (Conn. 2015) (remand for new trial when incorrect legal standard applied at bench trial)
- Doe v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 309 Conn. 146 (Conn. 2013) (discussing factors from Restatement § 302B for duty to guard against third‑party intentional misconduct)
- National Publishing Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 287 Conn. 664 (Conn. 2008) (refusal to give requested instruction held harmful error)
- Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co., 304 Conn. 679 (Conn. 2012) (standards for remittitur and appellate review of alleged excessive verdicts)
- Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357 (Conn. 2015) (recognition that jurors may apply common knowledge to conclude sexual abuse involves physical injury)
- Devalda, 306 Conn. 494 (Conn. 2012) (when reviewing jury instruction, examine entire charge to determine if omission could mislead jury)
- Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729 (Conn. 2002) (distinguishing foreseeability requirements in negligent infliction of emotional distress vs. general negligence)