Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37

Plaintiff "John Doe" was a JMU freshman who engaged in a sexual relationship with "Jane Roe"; Roe filed a sexual-misconduct complaint and an appeal board suspended Doe through spring 2020 after an initial not-responsible finding was reversed.
Doe sued JMU officials (President Jonathan Alger and VP Mark Warner) in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the disciplinary process denied due process (deprivation of liberty and property interests).
Doe moved to proceed under a pseudonym and for a protective order barring use of his and others’ real names; defendants initially did not oppose anonymity but later asserted anonymity was inappropriate.
The court applied the Fourth Circuit’s James factors (and considered irreparable reputational harm) to decide whether Doe’s privacy interest outweighed the presumption of open judicial proceedings.
The court found the relevant factors (sensitive subject matter, risk of retaliatory harm, youth of parties, lack of prejudice to defendants, and risk of irreparable harm to reputation) weighed in favor of anonymity.
The court granted Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym and ordered a protective order prohibiting use of Doe’s, Roe’s, and other students’ real names for the remainder of the case.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff may proceed anonymously	Doe: sexual-misconduct matter is highly sensitive; disclosure risks physical/mental harm, identification of Roe/others, and irreparable reputational harm that litigation would make unavoidable	Alger/Warner: anonymity unnecessary; Doe is an adult, has not shown specific threats, defendants know his identity and would be prejudiced if he speaks to media	Granted: court exercised discretion under James factors and found Doe’s privacy interest outweighs openness; anonymity and protective order ordered
Whether identification risks retaliation to plaintiff or non-parties	Doe: identification could spark harassment, violence, and public shaming of Roe and others	Defs: risk is speculative; Doe is banned from campus and cannot name specific threats	Court: weighed slightly in favor of anonymity given media attention and realistic risk to others
Whether youth of parties supports anonymity	Doe: parties were freshmen (18–19), young adults deserving protection	Defs: Doe is an adult, so factor favors disclosure	Court: favored anonymity because young-adult status and potential immaturity weigh toward protection
Whether defendant faces unfairness from anonymity	Doe: no unfairness; defendants know his identity and can defend the case	Defs: anonymity unfair because counsel/public comments undermine claim to hide identity	Court: no unfairness shown; factor favors anonymity

Doe v. Pittsylvania Cty., Va., 844 F. Supp. 2d 724 (W.D. Va. 2012) (discussing presumption of open judicial proceedings and circumstances supporting anonymity)
Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992) (articulating standard that anonymity requires privacy interest outweighing openness)
Doe 1 v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Va. 2004) (First Amendment public-access principles and openness of trials)
Doe v. Barrow County, 219 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (permitting anonymity where only the plaintiff’s name would be shielded)
James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993) (setting five-factor test for assessing requests to proceed anonymously)
Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (purpose of Rule 10(a) to identify parties and protect public interest in knowing parties’ identities)