DOE NO. 1 v. NOEM, 2:25-cv-01962

Background

In March–April 2025 ICE (Homeland Security Investigations/National Security Division) ran SEVIS student records (about 1.3 million F‑1/M‑1 entries) through the NCIC criminal database, producing ~16,000 positive hits, later narrowed to ~6,400 after identity-review, and provided that list to the State Department for action.
The State Department returned spreadsheets classifying records (some with valid travel visas, some with expired/no visa); ICE/SEVP then terminated SEVIS records for the students identified, often without prior notice to the students or their schools.
Plaintiff (identified as Student Doe No. 1) is an F‑1 student at Temple University whose SEVIS record was terminated April 10, 2025 based on an NCIC hit and visa-revocation classification; Temple and Plaintiff received no pre-termination notice.
Plaintiff alleges ICE/SEVP lacked statutory/regulatory authority to terminate SEVIS records solely on NCIC hits or visa revocations, and that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious and deprived him of procedural due process; he moved for and obtained a TRO and seeks a preliminary injunction converting that relief.
ICE/SEVP reactivated Plaintiff’s SEVIS record during litigation (April 24, 2025) and produced declarations and an April 26, 2025 SEVP “Broadcast Message” (new SEVIS policy) describing termination grounds, including visa revocation; plaintiffs contend the new policy exceeds agency authority and does not cure lack of process.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held (preliminary posture)
Whether ICE/SEVP lawfully terminated SEVIS records based solely on NCIC hits and/or State Dept. visa revocations	Termination based on an NCIC arrest hit or visa-revocation list is ultra vires, arbitrary and capricious under the APA because regs enumerate narrow grounds for termination and agency failed to consider relevant factors	ICE asserts it acted within discretionary enforcement authority, treated terminations as investigative red flags, and the State Dept. revocations inform removability; ICE later issued a new SEVIS guidance clarifying termination bases	Court granted preliminary relief for Plaintiff (TRO converted to PI requested); government represented Plaintiff was lawfully present and agreed to limited relief for Plaintiff pending agreement on language; factual record shows summary, rushed batch process without individualized prior notice
Whether Plaintiff was deprived of procedural due process by lack of notice and opportunity to be heard before SEVIS termination	Plaintiff had a protected interest in his educational status and ability to remain; termination occurred without individualized notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard—so Fifth Amendment due process was violated	Government contends termination is an administrative flag that does not by itself remove lawful presence and that schools/ICE field offices can remedy status; ICE also represents students remained lawfully present pending follow-up	Court treated lack of notice and risk of detention/removal and disruption to education as irreparable harms supporting injunctive relief for Plaintiff pending further proceedings
Mootness / voluntary cessation: whether reactivation moots claims	Reactivation alone does not moot claims because government bears heavy burden to show the challenged practice cannot reasonably recur; the new policy may expand, not limit, agency power and offers no binding protection	Government argues reactivation and policy change remove the live controversy for this Plaintiff	Court found reactivation insufficient to eliminate the need for injunction absent stronger, binding assurances; ordered parties to propose narrowly tailored relief for Plaintiff
Irreparable harm and public interest for preliminary injunction	Plaintiff faces irreparable harms: possible detention/removal, inability to complete degree, loss of OPT/CPT opportunities, reputational and financial injury; public interest favors adherence to statutory limits and due process	Government argues no immediate detention/removal was planned for Plaintiff and that public safety interests support agency actions	Court found irreparable harm and public interest weigh in Plaintiff’s favor for targeted interim relief; stayed broader merits determinations pending further briefing/agreements

Key Cases Cited

Jie Fang v. Dir., United States Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 935 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2019) (discusses limits on DHS authority regarding termination of F‑1 status and consequences for reinstatement eligibility)
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (principles on liberty interests of noncitizens and due process in immigration contexts)
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for preliminary injunctions; irreparable harm and likelihood of success requirements)
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (standard for APA review of agency action and limitation that courts review based on the agency’s invoked grounds)

(Notes: summary synthesizes the parties’ arguments, administrative record excerpts, and the court’s interim handling of the TRO/PI; the litigation remains at the preliminary‑injunction stage with the court seeking narrowly tailored relief for the named plaintiff.)