Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District, 659 F.3d 358

Plaintiff-Appellant Magees sue Covington County School District et al. under 42 U.S.C. §1983/§1985, claiming Jane Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process rights were violated and alleging related state-law claims.
Core question: whether a compulsory-attendance elementary school can have a constitutional “special relationship” with nine-year-old students imposing a duty to protect their personal security.
Complaint alleges the School repeatedly released Jane into the custody of an unauthorized adult, Tommy Keyes, during the school day for off-campus custody.
Check-out policy created a Form listing approved adults; employees allegedly did not verify Keyes’s identity or authorization.
District court dismissed for lack of duty and granted qualified immunity; the Fifth Circuit reversed in part, recognizing facial plausibility of a special-relationship claim and remanding.
This opinion clarifies a test for79 special relationship based on age, custody, and affirmative state action; dissenting views contest the majority’s expansion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does a public elementary school have a DeShaney special relationship with a nine-year-old student when it places her with an unauthorized private actor?	Does allege school’s affirmative checkout acts created custody and duty to protect.	School cannot create a special relationship with a voluntary-attendance student; no constitutional duty arises.	Yes; the complaint plausibly alleged a special relationship requiring protection.
Was the School’s deliberate indifference to Jane’s safety plausibly tied to a constitutional duty under the special-relationship theory?	Policy and conduct showed conscious disregard for known risk by releasing Jane to Keyes without verification.	Deliberate indifference alone is insufficient without a recognized special relationship.	Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claim is plausible under the special-relationship framework.
Are the individual defendants entitled to qualified immunity on the asserted §1983 claims?	Right at issue was clearly established by DeShaney and cited cases; liability should attach.	In 2007, the law was unsettled; no clearly established right for very young students in this context.	Qualified immunity affirmed for individual defendants; dismissal upheld at this stage.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989) (special relationship exception when state restrains liberty and fails to provide basic needs)
Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc; no special relationship in residential-school context)
Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc; compulsory attendance does not by itself create special relationship)
Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc; reiterated limits on school special-relationship theory)
Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989) (state-custody and private-custody dynamics; state’s custody can create relation under certain facts)
Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizes state’s duty to care for children under state supervision via foster-care context)