Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District
659 F.3d 358
5th Cir.2011Background
- Plaintiffs Daniel Magee and Geneva Magee sued the Covington County School District and officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and state law on behalf of nine-year-old Jane Doe for violations of due process and related claims.
- The Does allege Jane was repeatedly released during the school day to an unauthorized adult, Tommy Keyes, who sexually abused her off campus and was later returned to the School.
- The School had a formal “Permission to Check-Out Form” listing authorized adults but did not verify the identity of adults seeking check-out.
- The district court dismissed, finding no state-created danger or special relationship and granting qualified immunity to the Defendants.
- The en banc Fifth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the Does stated a facially plausible special-relationship claim and deliberate-indifference theory, and remanded for further proceedings.
- The majority’s decision centers on whether a compulsory-attendance elementary school can create a constitutional duty to protect a very young child when it places her with an unauthorized private actor during the school day.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the school have a DeShaney special relationship with Jane due to custodial confinement and affirmative acts? | School custody and delivery to Keyes created a custodial relationship imposing a protection duty. | Public schools generally do not create a DeShaney special relationship with students. | Yes, plausible special-relationship claim. |
| Was the school’s deliberate indifference shown by its checkout policy and failure to verify Keyes’s identity? | Policy and repeated checkouts without ID verification show deliberate indifference to safety. | Indifference not sufficiently pleaded; actual knowledge of unauthorized checkouts lacking. | Yes, facially plausible deliberate indifference. |
| Are state-created danger or Monell theories viable here? | State-created danger or Monell liability could attach due to policy and supervisory failures. | State-created danger not recognized in this circuit; Monell requires an underlying constitutional violation. | State-created danger not recognized; Monell not viable without a constitutional violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989) (general rule: state does not have a due-process duty to protect from private harm unless a special relationship exists)
- Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (special relationship does not arise in voluntary, non-custodial school contexts)
- Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School Dist., 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc; compulsory attendance alone does not create a special relationship)
- Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc; school duty not established by general tort-like considerations under §1983)
- Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990) (state-supervised foster care context recognizing special-relationship duty)
- Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirmative state action by delegating custody to private actor can create duty)
- Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc; public schools generally do not create a special relationship with students)
- Doe v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 197 F.App’x 296 (5th Cir. 2006) (no special relationship in certain school contexts; unpublished appellate decision cited for context)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (U.S. Supreme Court 1976) (recognizes constitutional duties related to basic human needs in custody contexts)