392 P.3d 295
Okla. Civ. App.2016Background
- Dobson Telephone Company (d/b/a McLoud Telephone) is an eligible local exchange provider serving ~11,000 subscribers; it relocated facilities on Choctaw Road at Oklahoma City’s direction to allow road widening and incurred about $420,842.41 in costs.
- Dobson sought reimbursement from the Oklahoma Universal Service Fund (OUSF), administered by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, under 17 O.S. §139.106(K)(1)(b).
- The Commission’s Public Utility Division recommended denial after finding the relocation was required by a municipal ordinance (Oklahoma City Ordinance No. 23499 50-13) rather than by state agencies (ODOT or county commissioners).
- The Commission denied reimbursement, interpreting the statutory phrase “federal or state regulatory rules, orders, or policies or by federal or state law” to exclude municipal ordinances.
- Dobson appealed; the appellate court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and considered statutory purpose, structure, and related provisions in holding the Commission’s interpretation erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “federal or state ... law” in 17 O.S. §139.106(K)(1)(b) excludes municipal ordinances | Dobson: phrase includes lawful municipal mandates; OUSF was intended to reimburse costs caused by government action generally | Commission: “state law” means acts of the State (legislation); municipal ordinances are excluded; only state agencies (ODOT/counties) trigger reimbursement | Court: Reversed — “federal or state ... law” includes lawful municipal action; municipal ordinances can be an "occurrence" under §139.106(K)(1) |
| Whether Commission’s post-hoc rule defining “State” controls statutory meaning | Dobson: statutory text lacks such a definition; ordinary meaning governs; agency rule cannot override Legislature | Commission: recent rule defines “State” as the State of Oklahoma, implying municipal acts are excluded | Court: Agency rule not dispositive; no legislative definition exists; court applies statutory construction and purpose rather than deferring to that agency rule |
| Whether textual canons (Russello/omission) require excluding municipalities where other subsections include “other governmental entity” | Dobson: reading provisions together and statutory purpose supports including municipalities; omission not dispositive | Commission: omission of “other governmental entity” in (K) shows intent to exclude municipalities (Russello canon) | Court: Omission creates only a presumption; structural/contextual reading and legislative purpose override strict application of that canon here |
| Whether the OUSF’s legislative purpose supports reimbursement for municipal-required relocations | Dobson: Fund’s purpose is broad—ensure universal service at reasonable, affordable rates; reimbursement for government-caused relocation costs fits | Commission/intervenors: Fund focused on rural/other specific contexts; policy does not require reimbursing municipal urban relocations | Court: Statutory purpose and allocation of road authority among State, counties, municipalities support including municipal mandates; Fund policy favors reimbursement in this case |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxell v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 318 P.3d 206 (Okla. 2013) (statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- Heffron v. Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., 77 P.3d 1069 (Okla. 2003) (courts review statutory interpretation de novo)
- Neil Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Inv. Corp., 932 P.2d 1100 (Okla. 1996) (de novo review described as non-deferential and plenary)
- Schulte Oil Co., Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 882 P.2d 65 (Okla. 1994) (agency’s longstanding construction may be accorded weight but can be overturned for cogent reasons)
- Oral Roberts Univ. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 714 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1985) (agency construction of ambiguous statute may be given deference but is not controlling)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (U.S. 1983) (omission of language in one statutory provision that appears in another gives rise to a presumption of intentional exclusion)
- Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988) (in absence of statutory definition, common word is given ordinary meaning)