302 F.R.D. 1
D.D.C.2013Background
- Plaintiffs are District of Columbia residents who, as preschool-age children with disabilities, sued in 2005 alleging systemic IDEA violations (failure to identify, evaluate, determine eligibility, and to ensure smooth Part C→Part B transitions).
- Earlier proceedings: the district court certified a broad class in 2006, granted summary judgment on liability for Child Find and transition claims (liability findings limited to pre-2007 data), and after a 2011 bench trial found continuing systemic failures through 2011 and entered injunctive relief.
- The D.C. Circuit vacated that class certification post-Wal‑Mart v. Dukes, holding the prior class was overbroad and remanding to reconsider class/subclass certification and to redetermine liability and relief.
- On remand plaintiffs proposed four Rule 23(b)(2) subclasses targeted to discrete IDEA duties: (1) identification/location; (2) timely initial evaluation; (3) timely eligibility determination; (4) smooth and effective Part C→Part B transitions.
- The district court (Nov. 8, 2013) certified those four subclasses, granted leave to amend the complaint, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (rejecting mootness and exhaustion defenses in large part), and declined to reinstate prior liability/remedial orders, instead ordering fact-finding on compliance since April 2011.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class certification / commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) | Subdivide the prior class into four subclasses each posing a common, dispositive statutory question (uniform failure to perform a specific IDEA duty). | The prior certification was overbroad; plaintiffs merely alleged violations of the same statute in many ways (post‑Wal‑Mart shows lack of commonality). | Certified four subclasses: each presents a common contention amenable to classwide resolution given centralized DC agencies and objective statutory duties. |
| Rule 23(b)(2) appropriateness and definiteness | Injunctive/declaratory relief aimed at uniform statutory duties is appropriate; subclass definitions are objective and ascertainable for (b)(2) purposes. | Injunctive remedies would require individualized determinations (citing Jamie S.) and subclass definitions are indefinite/administratively burdensome. | (b)(2) certification proper; subclass definitions sufficiently definite for injunctive class (ascertainability requirement relaxed for (b)(2)). |
| Reinstatement of prior liability/remedial orders | Plaintiffs sought reinstatement of the district court’s earlier liability findings and injunction. | District argued those prior findings should not be reinstated and contended improved compliance undermines liability. | Motion to reinstate is denied; court will conduct updated factfinding post‑April 2011 and then re-determine liability and relief. |
| Jurisdiction: standing, mootness, exhaustion | Named plaintiffs had live claims when suit commenced; IDEA claims are inherently transitory so class claims should relate back; exhaustion is futile or satisfied vicariously. | Named plaintiffs are now aged out so claims are moot and classless; one named plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies so case lacks jurisdiction. | Standing: satisfied at filing; mootness avoided by relation‑back/inherently transitory doctrine—subclass claims not moot. Exhaustion: court declines dismissal—futility and vicarious exhaustion doctrines apply; individual failure to exhaust by one plaintiff does not defeat the suit. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution)
- DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacated prior class certification and remanded after applying Wal‑Mart)
- DL v. District of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011) (district court findings on systemic IDEA noncompliance through trial period)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing assessed at the time suit is commenced)
- Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (class action may survive even if named plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot prior to certification)
- County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (recognizing inherently transitory claims and relation‑back for class certification)
- Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012) (vacating a broad (b)(2) IDEA class where remedial scheme required individualized determinations)