315 F. Supp. 3d 875
D. Maryland2018Background
- Plaintiffs (D.C. and Maryland) challenge President Trump (official capacity) for alleged violations of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses arising from his continued ownership interest in the Trump International Hotel (the Hotel) in D.C.
- Allegations: foreign governments, federal entities (via GSA lease), and at least one state (Maine) have patronized or conferred benefits on the Hotel, producing profits the President directly or indirectly receives; Congress has not consented to foreign receipts.
- President moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing “emolument” means compensation tied to an official’s office (i.e., payment for official services), so private commercial receipts are outside the Clauses.
- Court addressed standing previously and here interprets the Clauses’ text, original public meaning, purpose, and executive practice to decide the motion to dismiss.
- Court concludes (1) the President holds an "Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]," so the Foreign Clause applies to him; and (2) "emolument" means any profit, gain, or advantage (beyond de minimis) from foreign, federal, or state governments, including profits from private transactions; motion to dismiss denied for official-capacity claims related to the Hotel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the President is covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause ("office under the United States") | Framers used "office" broadly; Presidency is an office of profit and trust and was a principal target of anti-foreign-influence concerns | Amicus: "office under the United States" refers only to appointed statutory offices, not elected Presidency | The President is an "Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]" and is covered by the Foreign Clause |
| Meaning of "emolument" (foreign and domestic Clauses) | "Emolument" broadly means any "profit," "gain," or "advantage"; broad modifiers in text, founding-era dictionaries and practice, and Clause purposes (prevent influence) support broad reading | Narrow meaning: "emolument" = profit arising from an office or employment (compensation for official services); context (noscitur a sociis), other Constitution provisions, and supposed historical practice support narrow view | Court adopts broad meaning: any profit/gain/advantage (more than de minimis) from foreign, federal, or state governments, including private commercial profits |
| Whether receipts from private commercial dealings (e.g., hotel rentals at fair market value) can be "emoluments" | Such private receipts can be emoluments if they produce profit/advantage from government patrons and thus risk undue influence; executive precedent supports this | If limited to official compensation, many routine private transactions would be excluded; narrow reading avoids absurd overbreadth | Court: private commercial profits from government patrons can be emoluments; de minimis and vested exceptions may apply (e.g., fully vested pensions) |
| Whether alleged facts about Hotel patronage, the GSA lease, state patronage, and D.C. tax concessions state plausible claims | Plaintiffs allege foreign governments and states spent funds at the Hotel, GSA reversed position re: lease benefit, and D.C. tax breaks reduced hotel taxes — these plausibly yield emoluments | Defendant argued the Amended Complaint fails to state claims under his narrower emolument theory | Court finds allegations plausibly state Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clause claims and denies motion to dismiss as to those official-capacity claims |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (textualist starting point for constitutional interpretation)
- United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (plain-meaning rule for constitutional text)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (use of founding-era dictionaries to ascertain original public meaning)
- NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (historical practice as interpretive aid)
- McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (difficulty of proving bribery/quid pro quo; relevance to scope of anti-corruption measures)
- Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. 109 (statutory/office-tied usage of "emolument" not controlling for Clauses' broader context)
- Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (every word of constitutional text should have force; cited in parties' textual arguments)