Hoyt v. United States

51 U.S. 109 | SCOTUS | 1850

51 U.S. 109 (____) 10 How. 109

JESSE HOYT, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE UNITED STATES.

Supreme Court of United States.

The cause was argued by Mr. Evans and Mr. Walker, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Crittenden, Attorney-General, for the defendants in error.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court held in and for the Southern District of New York, in a suit brought by the United States against the late collector of the port of New York, to recover a balance claimed in the settlement of his accounts.

The defendant had been collector from the 29th of March, 1838, to the 2d of March, 1841, and on a final adjustment of his accounts, at the close of his official term, a balance against him was found due by the accounting officers of the Treasury of $216,048.07.

The counsel for the plaintiff produced on the trial four Treasury transcripts containing a statement of his accounts with the government for the whole period of his term, and which resulted in the balance above stated.

These transcripts were objected to, as not competent evidence against the defendant of the balance therein found due, within the meaning of the act of Congress providing for this species of proof. Act of 3d March, 1797 (1 Stat. at Large, 512).

The second section of the act provides, that in every case of delinquency, where a suit has been brought, a transcript from the books and proceedings of the Treasury, certified by the Register, and authenticated under the seal of the Department, shall be admitted as evidence, upon which the court is authorized to give judgment.

It has been already determined, under this act, that an account stated at the Treasury, which does not arise in the ordinary mode of doing business in that Department, can derive no additional validity from being certified according to its provisions; and that the statement can only be regarded as establishing items for moneys disbursed through the ordinary channels of the Department, where the transactions are shown by its books; in such cases the officers have official knowledge of the facts stated. (United States v. Buford, 3 Peters, 29.) That when moneys come into the hands of an individual, not through the officers of the Treasury, or in the regular course of official duty, the books of the Treasury do not exhibit the facts, nor can they be known to the Department. (Ibid.)

It was held in the United States v. Buford, that a Treasury transcript was not competent proof against the defendant in respect to moneys coming into his hands from a third person not in the regular course of official business; and that the evidence on which the statement of the account was founded should have been produced. (See also United States v. Jones, 8 Peters, 375.)

In the case before us, the several items of account in the transcripts arise out of the official transactions of the defendant, as collector, with the Treasury Department, and were founded upon his quarterly and other accounts, rendered in pursuance of law and the instructions of the Secretary. They were substantial copies of these quarterly returns, revised and corrected by the accounting officers as they were received, and with copies of which the defendant had been furnished in the usual course of the Department; they present a mutual account of debit and credit, arising out of his official dealings with the government in the collection of the public revenue.

We can hardly conceive of a case, therefore, coming more directly within the act of Congress as expounded by the cases referred to.

In the case of the United States v. Eckford's Executors (1 How. 250), a transcript corresponding with the one in question was held to be competent evidence of the balance of the account. The point was presented in a certificate of a division of opinion of the judges.

It has also been objected to these transcripts, that some of the items included contain a charge against the defendant in gross; such as the aggregate amount of the duty bonds and of duties accruing within the quarter, reference being made to the abstracts for the particular items composing each amount. This objection was not specially pointed out at the trial, as the one made then was to the admissibility of the transcripts generally. If made then, it might have been removed by the production of copies of the abstracts. They were called for, in the course of the trial, in respect to the item of bonds in the quarterly account of the 31st March, 1838, and produced. This affords a full answer to the objection.

But we do not intend to admit that it would have been available, if made at the proper time. We agree, that a transcript of a gross balance against the officer would be objectionable, as the act of 1797 obviously contemplates, to some extent, a detailed statement of the accounts between him and the government. It must be "a transcript from the books and proceedings of the Treasury," which doubtless will usually present such a statement. The amount of the detail, or degree to which the particulars of the account should be carried, must necessarily be left open to the exercise of some discretion, as there can be no fixed rule by which to determine it.

The necessity of greater particularity than exhibited here in the several transcripts, to guard the officers against surprise, and afford an opportunity for explanation, is not very apparent; for they contain the several items making up the quarterly returns of the party himself, with the addition of such errors as the accounting officers may have detected in their examination; and with all of which he had been furnished.

If the accounting officers, therefore, have fallen into error, the officer has had ample time and means for inquiry and correction. This is true as it respects each quarterly account rendered.

Besides, by the fourth section of the act of 1797, no claim for an equitable credit can be admitted, upon the trial, but such as shall appear to have been presented to the accounting officers for examination, and by them disallowed, except in case of vouchers, which the officer was not before able to procure, or was prevented from exhibiting, by absence or unavoidable accident.

As a general rule, therefore, every item of the account that can be the subject of litigation at the trial, on the production of a transcript, must have been a matter of dispute at the Treasury Department, and, of course, presenting nothing new or unexpected to either of the parties.

If the transcript contains the accounts, debits, and credits, as acted upon at the Department by the accounting officers, it would seem to be sufficient as it respects the particulars of the account required by the act.

The court is of opinion, therefore, that the several Treasury transcripts given in evidence were properly admitted.

The comptroller, in the adjustment of the accounts, rejected nineteen items, that were claimed by the defendant as legal or equitable credits, which, in the aggregate, exceeded the amount of the balance reported against him. All of them except four were either allowed by the court, or submitted to the jury as a matter of fact involving no principle of law, and, of course, require no further notice.

Among the items rejected is a charge of $36,712.71, for fees payable by persons engaged in trade and navigation for certain services, performed by the collector at each port, such as giving permits to land goods, clearances, bills of health, &c., and which were chargeable under the compensation act of 2d March, 1799 (1 Stat. at Large, 705, § 2). These fees were divided between the collector, naval officer, and surveyor, in districts in which these several officers are appointed. The collector in the district of New York was also entitled to a commission of one quarter of one per cent. on all moneys received on account of duties on goods, or tonnage of vessels.

By an amendment of this act, April 30, 1802 (2 Stat. at Large, 172, § 3), it was provided, that whenever the annual emoluments of any collector, after deducting the expenses incident to the office, shall amount to more than five thousand dollars, the excess shall be accounted for, and paid into the Treasury. The act was not to extend to fines, forfeitures, and penalties, a share of which the collector was entitled to, under the twentieth section of the act of 2d March, 1799 (1 Stat. at Large, 697).

The act of 7th March, 1822, reduced this maximum to four thousand dollars per annum, and the commission to one sixth of one per cent. on the moneys received. (3 Stat. at Large, 694, 695, §§ 7, 9.)

It is insisted by the defendant, that the limitation in the aforesaid acts does not refer to or embrace the fees allowed to him under the act of 1799; and that the collector was still entitled to apply them to his own use.

At the date of the act of 1802, the compensation of the collector was derived from three sources; — 1. fees allowed for the services already referred to; 2. commissions on the duties received; and 3. a share of the fines, penalties, and forfeitures. The emoluments of the office were dependent upon the receipts from these sources; and the officer was entitled to apply to his own use the whole amount derived from them.

The provision in this act, therefore, that whenever the annual emoluments, after deducting the expenses, exceeded the amount of five thousand dollars, the excess should be accounted for, necessarily embraces in the limitation the fees as well as commissions belonging to the office, and would have embraced also the fines and forfeitures, had it not been for the proviso to the act taking them out of the limitation.

The argument would be quite as strong in favor of excluding the commissions as in the case of fees, as the one can in no more appropriate sense be regarded as emoluments of office than the other, and thus the limitation would become a nullity.

These terms denote a compensation for a particular kind of service to be performed by the officer, and are distinguishable from each other, and are so used and understood by Congress in the several compensation acts; they are also distinguishable from the term emoluments, that being more comprehensive, and embracing every species of compensation or pecuniary profit derived from a discharge of the duties of the office; and such is the obvious import of it in these acts.

The act of 1822, so far as respects this question, was simply a reënactment of that of 1802, with the exception of fixing the limit of compensation to four instead of five thousand dollars.

But it is unnecessary to pursue this argument further, as there is another view of the question, founded upon subsequent acts of Congress, that is entirely decisive.

The third section of "An Act to provide for the support of the Military Academy of the United States for the year 1838, and for other purposes," passed 7 July, 1838 (5 Stat. at Large, 264), provides, that the Secretary of the Treasury shall be authorized to pay collectors, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as will give to them the same compensation in the year 1838, according to the importations of that year, as they would have been entitled to receive, if the act of 14th July, 1832, had not gone into effect; provided, that they shall not receive a greater annual salary or compensation than was paid for the year 1832; and provided, also, that the collectors shall render to the Secretary, under oath, a quarterly account of all fees and emoluments whatever, by them received, together with the expenses of their office; and provided further, that no collector shall receive more than four thousand dollars per annum.

This provision was continued in force for the years 1839, 1840, and down to the 3d of March, 1841, when the mode of compensation was materially changed. (5 Stat. at Large, p. 431, § 2; p. 432, § 7. 6 Stat. at Large, 815.)

The provision relating to the year 1840 is not to be found in the public statutes at large, as it is embraced in the seventh section of "An Act for the relief of Chastelain and Ponvert, and for other purposes," passed 21st July, 1840. Being a private act, it was not incorporated in the public statutes in Little & Brown's edition of 1846.

It will be seen by the act of 1838, that the collector is bound to account to the Secretary of the Treasury for all the fees and emoluments received by him in the execution of the duties of his office, and that his annual compensation was limited, as in the act of 1822, to an amount not exceeding the sum of four thousand dollars. The same act required that the naval officers and surveyors should make a return of their fees and emoluments, and limited the annual amount of their compensation.

During the period, therefore, of the term of office of the defendant as collector of the port of New York, which extended from the 29th of March, 1838, to the 2d of March, 1841, there can be no pretence for claiming that the limitation, as respected his annual compensation, did not apply as well to the fees received under the act of 1799, as to commissions or emoluments of office derived from any other source. He was required in express terms to account for them to the Treasury, the same as in the case of other emoluments.

Another item claimed, and which was rejected by the court, is a charge of $ 14,035.29 for a moiety of the duties received on goods that were seized, and afterwards condemned for a violation of the revenue laws.

This question turns upon a construction of sections 89 and 91 of the revenue act of 2d March, 1799 (1 Stat. at Large, 695, 696).

Section 89 provides, among other things, that the claimant, after the seizure of the vessel and merchandise, may procure the same to be redelivered to him on the execution of a bond with sureties for the payment of the appraised value, together with the payment or security of the duties, the same as if the vessel and goods had been legally entered at the customs. If judgment shall afterwards pass in favor of the claimant in the proceedings instituted, the bond shall be cancelled; if against him, then, unless he pays into the court the amount of the appraised value of the ship and goods, together with the costs, within twenty days, judgment shall be entered on the bond by a motion in open court, without further delay.

In case no bond is given by the claimant, and the vessel and goods have been condemned, the same are to be sold at public auction by the marshal to the highest bidder, and the proceeds paid over to the collector. (§ 90.)

Section 91 provides, that all fines, penalties, and forfeitures recovered by virtue of the act, after deducting costs and expenses, shall be disposed of as follows: one moiety shall be paid by the collector into the treasury for the use of the United States; and the other equally divided between him, the naval officer, and the surveyor of the port.

It will be seen, therefore, by these provisions, in cases of seizure, where the claimant elects to give a bond, and pay or secure the payment of the duties, with a view to a redelivery of the vessel and goods, that, if the same be condemned, he loses as well the duties paid or secured, as the property seized and condemned. It is a moiety of these duties which accrued during the term of the defendant, as collector, that he claims as a portion of the forfeitures belonging to him under the ninety-first section of the act.

A conclusive answer to this claim, in the judgment of the court, is, that the duties thus paid constitute no part of the proceeds of the goods forfeited, in which only the collector has an interest. The proceeds are the appraised value secured by the bond, or, in case no bond be given, the amount derived from the sale by the marshal, after the deduction of all proper charges. The payment of the duties is a condition to the acceptance of the bond, and redelivery of the goods, and is the voluntary act of the claimant. They do not enter into the question of condemnation, nor constitute any part of the forfeiture declared by the act, or the judgment of the court.

It is true, the collector acquires by the seizure an inchoate right to the goods, which, when followed by condemnation, becomes absolute to the extent of his share of the forfeiture (1 Wheat. 462; 4 ib. 74); but it is a right only in the goods themselves, which have been seized and forfeited, — the rem, a moiety of which, it is admitted, has already been allowed to him.

This view is in conformity with the language of the act (§ 91), which is, that all fines, penalties, and forfeitures, recovered by virtue of this act, shall be disposed of, one moiety to the government, the other to the collector, to be divided as therein declared.

The case is not like that of McLane v. The United States, 6 Peters, 405. There the sum in controversy was reserved out of the forfeiture by the act for the relief of the owners; and was regarded by the court as part and parcel of it.

The only doubt that existed was, whether or not the amount thus reserved should be considered as the legal duties belonging to the government, or a portion of the forfeiture, the residue of which had been remitted. The amount reserved was to be equal to the double duties imposed upon goods imported, under certain circumstances, by an act which had been passed since the forfeiture accrued; and the court was of opinion, that duties mentioned in that act were referred to simply as a measure to determine the sum to be reserved, and not as duties in the common acceptation of the term. The amount reserved, therefore, was so much excepted out of the forfeiture remitted, a moiety of which properly belonged to the collector.

Another item rejected by the court is a charge by the defendant of $ 201,500 commissions, for accepting and paying drafts of the Treasury during his term in office.

These commissions are claimed on the ground that the services required and performed were extra services, not incident to the proper legal duties belonging to the office of collector, and that he is entitled, therefore, to a reasonable remuneration for the same, beyond the compensation annexed to the office.

By the act of 2d March, 1799, § 21 (1 Stat. at Large, 642), it is provided that the collector shall receive all moneys paid for duties, and take all bonds for securing the payment thereof; and shall, at all times, pay to the order of the officers, who shall be authorized to direct the payment thereof, the whole of the moneys which he may receive by virtue of the act, and shall once in every three months, or oftener, if required, transmit his accounts to the Treasury Department for settlement.

The Secretary of the Treasury is the head of that Department; and has devolved on him the superintendence and collection of the public revenue; and is the officer properly authorized to direct the safe-keeping and payment or disbursement of the same. (1 Stat. at Large, 65, 66.)

Under the authority thus given, and which has been exercised since the foundation of the government, the Secretary, by a circular dated 9th June, 1837, in consequence of the suspension of specie payments by the banks in which the public moneys had been deposited, directed that all public moneys received by the collectors, except such as were required for current expenses of the office, &c., should be placed to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, in a separate account, on the books of the customs, and that the same would be drawn for by the Treasurer's drafts on the collector, from time to time, as the necessities or the convenience of the government required.

This mode of keeping and paying out the public moneys received by the collectors in the different collection districts continued during a considerable part of the term of office of the defendant; and, doubtless, very much increased the duties of the office, its labors and responsibilities, for which he may well be equitably entitled, at the hands of the proper authorities, to a corresponding compensation; and it is not at all improbable, that to the necessity of keeping on hand such large sums of the public moneys as are daily and weekly collected at the port of New York, and the disbursement in comparatively small sums, upon the drafts of the Treasurer, may be attributed, in part, at least, the great deficiency in the accounts. It must have required extraordinary diligence and accuracy, and very competent and faithful subordinates, to have prevented it.

But be this as it may, we are unable to perceive that the duties thus imposed, onerous and responsible as they undoubtedly were, exceeded those legally incident to the office; or such as the Secretary was authorized to require as the head of the Treasury.

The depositories of the public revenue, as provided by the act of 23d June, 1836, having failed to comply with the conditions required of them, the duty of regulating the safe-keeping and disbursement devolved upon the sound discretion of this officer; and indeed, on looking into the provisions of that act, and the numerous and complicated conditions and restrictions annexed to the employment of the banks as depositaries, it is difficult to say, that the authority there conferred to use them formed any exception to this discretion. If they refused to become depositaries, or failed to comply with the conditions, or, in the judgment of the Secretary, were unsafe, it was his duty to provide some other mode for the safe-keeping and disbursement, and until some other was provided, those officers immediately concerned in the receipt and collection of the revenue must necessarily become the depositaries, and disbursing officers of whatever amount they may have received.

If other depositories be provided by law, or by the regulations of the Secretary, the money is then deposited there by the collector, in sums large or small, as received, according to the instructions of the Secretary; if not, it remains in their hands until drawn out, from time to time, as the necessities of the government may require, upon drafts by the same authority. In either case, the collector is but performing the duties enjoined by the act of 1799, which provides, that he shall receive all moneys paid for duties, and shall, at all times, pay them over upon the order of the officer authorized to direct the payment. The duty is the same in both cases, the nature of the service the same, and the obligation to perform the service dependent upon the same authority.

This mode of keeping and disbursing the public revenue has existed since the foundation of the government. Even when the banks have been used as depositories, either by act of Congress, or by the regulations of the head of the Treasury, it was not, at all times and places, practicable for the different collectors and receivers to make the deposit, and in such cases the moneys were kept until drawn for by the proper authority.

The Bank of the United States, and the State banks, under the act of 1836, with some slight exceptions, are the only instances, I believe, in which Congress have undertaken to control the discretion of the Secretary, as to the place in which the public moneys shall be kept, down to the act of 1840, when a new system was established, usually known as the sub-treasury. (5 Stat. at Large, 385.)

With these exceptions, the place of deposit, if any was designated, or the mode of making payments by the collectors, depended upon the regulations of the Treasury. And it is not to be doubted but that it was as much their duty to conform to the orders of that Department, under such circumstances, whether for deposit or payment, as in the cases in which the depositories had been designated by act of Congress. In the one case, the orders rested upon the general power vested in the Department by the act of 1789; in the others, upon the same power, modified by the subsequent acts prescribing the particular depositories.

But there is another view of this branch of the case, which must not be overlooked, and that is, whether, assuming that the services of the defendant were extra and beyond those incident to the office, the court erred in rejecting the claim.

The act of 1822, already referred to, as we have seen, limited the fees and emoluments of the office to an amount not exceeding the sum of $ 4,000. The act of 1838, and which was continued through the term of office of the defendant, contained a like restriction, and the eighteenth section of the act of 1822 further provided, that no collector should ever receive more than four hundred dollars, exclusive of his compensation as collector, and the fines and forfeitures allowed by law, for any services he may perform for the United States in any other office or capacity.

It would be extremely difficult to say, even if the defendant is right as to the nature of the service performed, in the face of this provision, that a court of law could sanction the compensation claimed, or any other compensation for such service. The very ground of claim here is that the service was rendered in a capacity other than that of collector.

The two limitations, the one upon his compensation as collector, and the other upon compensation for service in any other office or capacity, while acting as collector, would seem to close up every "loophole" through which any additional remuneration could be claimed in a court of justice. But this is not all.

By the eighth section of the act of 3d March, 1839 (5 Stat. at Large, 349), it is provided, "that no officer in any branch of the public service, or any other person whose salaries, or whose pay or emoluments, is or are fixed by law and regulations, shall receive any extra allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever, for the disbursement of public money, or the performance of any other service, unless the said extra allowance or compensation be authorized by law."

It is impossible to misunderstand this language, or the purpose and intent of the enactment. It cuts up by the roots these claims by public officers for extra compensation, on the ground of extra services. There is no discretion left in any officer or tribunal to make the allowance, unless it is authorized by some law of Congress. The prohibition is general, and applies to all public officers, or quasi public officers, who have a fixed compensation.

This act, together with the act of 13th August, 1841, making it penal for any officer charged with the safe-keeping or disbursement of the public money to convert it to his own use, or to neglect or refuse to pay it over upon the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, present a system of legislation against these claims for extra compensation by public officers, that, if fairly carried into effect, must, for aught we see, effectually extinguish them, except when allowed by the authority of Congress; and which, it must be admitted, is the proper constitutional tribunal to decide upon the matter.

Another item in the account rejected by the court is a claim of $ 109,000, for excess of deposits for unascertained duties, which it is supposed has been twice charged by the accounting officers against the defendant in the adjustment of his accounts.

The item does not appear among those presented to the comptroller, and to have been rejected by him, but it is claimed that the error is shown upon the face of the account, and, therefore, available to the defence.

This sum was the subject of comment by the defendant in his correspondence with the Department at the time of closing the settlement of his accounts, in June, 1841, but he seems to have been unable to satisfy himself at that time that the amount had been twice charged against him.

By the second section of the act of 3d March, 1839 (5 Stat. at Large, 348), all moneys paid to the collector for unascertained duties were directed to be placed to the credit of the Treasurer, and to be kept and disposed of as other moneys paid for duties; and should not be held by him to await the ascertainment of the duties; and, whenever it was shown to the Secretary of the Treasury that more money had been paid than covered the actual duties when ascertained, it should be his duty to draw a warrant upon the Treasurer to refund the amount.

The regulation, under this act, at the Treasury, was, to permit the collector to refund the excess of duties, as they were ascertained, to the importer, keeping a separate account of the same, and at the end of each month to make a return to the Department of the amount, accompanied with the vouchers, when a warrant was drawn in his favor, refunding the amount. The aggregate amount of this excess thus paid by the collector during his term, and for which warrants were drawn in his favor, constitutes the sum in question. The defendant supposes it has been twice charged in his accounts, once in the credit given to the government for the amount of unascertained duties, and again by charging him with these warrants. If this were true, the error would be obvious, and being so obvious, it is difficult to believe it could have occurred; or, if it had, that either the Department or the defendant could not have readily detected it.

It is, however, sufficient for the purposes of this case to say, we are unable to perceive any evidence upon the face of the accounts, or indeed in the record, tending to establish it, and that the court were right, therefore, in the instructions given to the jury.

If the whole of the unascertained duties were credited to the government, then the warrants drawn to reimburse the collector for the payment of the excess should not be charged in his customs account. If the credit was for the net or actual duties only, then it would be proper to charge them. How this may be, it is impossible to say from any thing in the record. An examination at the Treasury Department would, doubtless, have removed any difficulty in the account.

Another item claimed by the defendant, and rejected by the court, is a charge of $ 1,063.84 deducted from the maximum compensation for the year 1838, the service having commenced on the 29th day of March in that year, when he entered upon the duties of his office. The defendant claimed compensation for the entire year.

The act of 1838, already referred to in another branch of this case, which provided for the compensation of the collector for the year, made it virtually a salary office, with the addition of his share of the fines, penalties, and forfeitures, and the pro rata allowance, therefore, for the portion of the year the defendant held an office was all that could be legally claimed. The case is distinguishable from that of The United States v. Dickens, 15 Peters, 141.

The question is of no importance now, as it has since been settled by an express act of Congress. (9 Stat. at Large, 3.)

There were some other questions of minor importance presented in the argument, but which, in our judgment, cannot materially affect the result, and need not, therefore, be particularly noticed.

After the best consideration we have been able to give to the case, we are of opinion that the several rulings of the court below were correct, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.