328 Conn. 688
Conn.2018Background
- Thomas J. Hickey resigned from the Connecticut bar in 2008 and, at that time, knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to seek reinstatement; the resignation resolved pending disciplinary inquiries into an IOLTA overdraft and related audits.
- Hickey later filed an application for reinstatement in 2012, arguing his prior waiver did not preclude a present determination of his current fitness to practice.
- Disciplinary Counsel and the Statewide Grievance Committee moved to dismiss the reinstatement application as barred by Hickey’s prior waiver; the motions sat largely unresolved for years while Hickey submitted affidavits claiming family pressure and audit compliance.
- The trial court concluded it had authority to entertain a motion to dismiss raising the threshold question of eligibility and held that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to seek reinstatement permanently bars a later application.
- The court rejected Hickey’s contentions that (1) Practice Book §2-53(b)’s 2014 amendment could not be applied retroactively, and (2) the matter had to be referred to a standing committee under Practice Book §2-53(a).
- Hickey appealed; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the common-law rule (and the 2014 codification) bars reinstatement after a valid waiver and that the court may dismiss ineligible applications without committee referral.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2014 Practice Book amendment barring reinstatement after a prior waiver may be applied to Hickey's 2012 application | Amendment reflects existing rule; waiver permanently bars reinstatement | Amendment is substantive and not retroactive to his 2012 filing | Court avoided retroactivity question; held common-law rule already barred reinstatement after a knowing, voluntary waiver |
| Whether the trial court had authority to dismiss an application as ineligible rather than refer it to a standing committee | Court may decide threshold eligibility issues and dismiss to conserve resources | Rule §2-53(a) requires referral of all applications to standing committee; committee should decide | Court held trial court has inherent authority to entertain motions to dismiss and decide eligibility as a threshold matter |
| Whether Hickey's waiver was not knowing and voluntary (thus invalid) | Waiver invalid because he was not advised of appellate rights and acted under family duress | Waiver was canvassed, he affirmed voluntariness, and affidavits did not negate knowing consent | Court found affidavits insufficient to vitiate waiver; no evidentiary hearing required given accepted facts |
| Whether a motion to dismiss was an improper procedural vehicle because eligibility is not a jurisdictional issue | Plaintiff: dismissals are proper to confer finality on threshold eligibility | Defendant: eligibility is not subject-matter jurisdiction; must go to committee | Court held dismissal is a proper procedural device; need not resolve whether eligibility is strictly jurisdictional |
Key Cases Cited
- Narayan v. Narayan, 305 Conn. 394 (procedural rules generally apply retroactively; new practice rules presumed prospective absent clarification intent)
- D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610 (distinguishing substantive and procedural rules)
- In re Application of Eberhart, 267 Conn. 667 (appellate adoption of trial-court conclusion that a knowing, voluntary waiver of reapplication is binding)
- Florida Bar v. Mattingly, 342 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1977) (agreement to resign and never petition for reinstatement is permanently binding)
- Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1 (attorney-discipline proceedings are sui generis; courts retain plenary power to regulate the bar)
- Miller v. Appellate Court, 320 Conn. 759 (courts have inherent power to manage dockets and dismiss to prevent undue delay)
- Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642 (when jurisdictional determinations depend on disputed facts, evidentiary hearing may be required)
- Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim, 311 Conn. 430 (standing committee factfinding is reviewable for reasonableness; courts defer to committee credibility findings)
- Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, 220 Conn. 812 (trial court may not substitute its credibility assessments for those of a factfinding committee)