Direct Commercial Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill Estates, LLC and Intesar Husain Zaidi
407 S.W.3d 398
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Direct Commercial Funding (Direct) sued Beacon Hill Estates, LLC and Intesar Zaidi for breach of a non-defamation hold-harmless agreement and for defamation after Zaidi posted complaints online following a loan denial.
- Zaidi filed an answer with counterclaims, a third-party complaint, and a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (anti‑SLAPP statute).
- The motion to dismiss was submitted for hearing on June 25, 2012; the trial court did not rule within 30 days, so by statute the motion was automatically overruled by operation of law.
- Seventy‑two days after the hearing (six weeks after the statutory 30‑day window), the trial court signed an order granting Zaidi’s motion, awarding costs and fees, and directing an affidavit of fees.
- Direct filed a timely interlocutory appeal challenging the late grant; the court of appeals considered whether the trial court had authority to grant the motion after it had been overruled by operation of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court could grant an anti‑SLAPP motion after it was overruled by operation of law for failure to rule within 30 days | Direct: The motion was overruled by operation of law 30 days after the hearing, so the court lacked authority to grant it later | Zaidi: A trial court with plenary power may set aside interlocutory matters and could grant the motion later | Court: Reversed — trial court erred; the Act contains a mandatory 30‑day rule and no provision allowing a later grant once overruled by operation of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2011) (statutory construction reviewed de novo; plain text controls)
- Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (motion under the Act was overruled by operation of law when court failed to rule within 30 days)
- Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1993) (trial court’s ability to set aside orders discussed in procedural‑rule context)