DiMartile v. Hochul
80f4th443
2d Cir.2023Background
- Plaintiffs: two engaged couples (DiMartile & Crawford; Giglia & Durolek) and a minister challenged New York’s COVID-19 50-person cap on nonessential gatherings (including weddings) under § 1983.
- Plaintiffs sought expedited relief; the district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement as to them only, issued about 45 minutes before DiMartile & Crawford’s scheduled ceremony, allowing that couple to hold a >100-guest wedding.
- Defendants promptly appealed; this Court granted a temporary administrative stay and then a full stay pending appeal about two weeks after the injunction issued.
- Giglia & Durolek later announced they would not hold their wedding while restrictions remained, the appeal was dismissed as moot, and the preliminary injunction was vacated and the case remanded.
- Plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; the district court denied fees, concluding plaintiffs were not "prevailing parties," and the Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district-court preliminary injunction confers "prevailing party" status under § 1988 | The injunction reflected a merits-based likelihood of success and thus is "actual relief on the merits" sufficient for fees | A preliminary injunction is transient; if later stayed/reversed it does not materially alter the parties' legal relationship | No. A hastily entered injunction that is quickly stayed/undone does not confer prevailing-party status |
| Whether DiMartile & Crawford’s ability to hold one wedding during the injunction makes them prevailing parties | Their wedding was a direct, concrete benefit conferred by the injunction, so fees follow | The benefit was ephemeral and undone by the appellate stay; it did not change Defendants’ conduct in an enduring way | No. The temporary, short-lived relief was insufficient to make them prevailing parties |
| Whether Giglia & Durolek or the minister Shamenda prevailed | Giglia & Durolek stress the injunction; Shamenda asserts broader free exercise harms | Giglia & Durolek received no practical relief because the stay precluded their wedding; Shamenda received no merits ruling | No. Giglia & Durolek got no lasting benefit; Shamenda received no favorable merits decision |
| Whether an appellate stay pending appeal undermines a district court’s merits assessment such that the injunction is "undone" | A stay does not itself reverse merits findings; Haley allows fee awards from preliminary injunctions | A stay requires a showing on likelihood of success and thus signals the injunction was not an enduring merits victory; Sole rejects fee awards for transient victories | The stay here effectively "undid" the injunction and undercuts prevailing-party status for fee purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007) (preliminary injunction later reversed/undone is insufficient to confer prevailing-party status)
- Haley v. Pataki, 106 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1997) (preliminary injunction can confer prevailing-party status if grounded in a merits assessment)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (prevailing party requires actual relief that materially alters legal relationship)
- Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989) (touchstone is material alteration of legal relationship)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (standards for a stay pending appeal, including likelihood of success on the merits)
- Kirk v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 644 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing durable relief that a plaintiff is "entitled to keep")
- Doe v. Nixon, 716 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2013) (preliminary injunction stayed pending appeal did not make plaintiffs prevailing parties)
- United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (vacatur of lower-court judgment when case becomes moot on appeal)