Dilfanian v. New York City Department of Education, 700 F. App'x 5

Dilfanian was an Assistant Principal for Supervision of Mathematics at New Utrecht High School (NUHS) from 2006 to 2010 and also served as a U.S. Army Reserve Major.
He was terminated at the end of the 2009–10 school year following the principal's recommendation and alleged to have been motivated by deployment concerns.
Dilfanian sued the NYC Department of Education (DOE) and Goldfarb under USERRA, claiming protection against discrimination based on military service.
USERRA prohibits adverse employment actions based on membership or obligation to perform service in a uniformed service, with liability where such status is a motivating factor.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding there was no prima facie case and that any performance issues justified termination regardless of military status.
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, recognizing that the record could support a prima facie case and that the invasion of bias and the supervisor’s role could influence the outcome under USERRA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there a prima facie USERRA discrimination claim based on deployment?	Dilfanian argues Goldfarb’s reactions show bias tied to deployment.	Goldfarb/DOE maintain termination flowed from performance issues, not bias.	Yes; evidence could support a prima facie case.
Can DOE rebut with an affirmative defense showing it would have terminated regardless?	Disputed performance issues undermine the defense.	The record shows significant performance problems justifying termination.	Remand to determine whether the defense defeats liability.
Does supervisor bias imputable to DOE establish USERRA liability?	Supervisor's conduct (Goldfarb) reflects antimilitary animus driving termination.	Liability hinges on ultimate decision-maker; independent reviewers negate bias.	Remand; district court should address supervisor liability in first instance.

NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims (cited as governing standard))
Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, 75 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1996) (instructions on not granting summary judgment where genuine dispute exists)
Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1997) (direct evidence of discrimination is rare; circumstantial proof may prove discrimination)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (credibility and inferences are jury functions; summary judgment proper only if no rational dispute)
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (supervisor bias that is a proximate cause of adverse action makes employer liable)
Farricielli v. Holbrook, 215 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2000) (practice of addressing arguments in first instance by district court)