Dijon Sharpe v. Winterville Police Department, 59 F.4th 674

During a lawful traffic stop in October 2018, passenger Dijon Sharpe began livestreaming the encounter on Facebook Live; Officer Helms attempted to seize Sharpe’s phone and officers told Sharpe he could record but not livestream and that future livestreaming would lead to phone seizure or arrest.
Sharpe sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: official-capacity claims (effectively against the Town of Winterville via Monell) alleging a policy banning livestreaming, and an individual-capacity claim against Officer Helms.
The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendants, concluding the alleged policy did not violate the First Amendment and dismissing the individual claim on qualified immunity grounds.
The Fourth Circuit panel held livestreaming a traffic stop is First Amendment–protected speech and found Sharpe plausibly alleged a Town policy banning livestreaming, vacating the district court’s judgment as to the official-capacity claim and remanding for further proceedings.
The court affirmed dismissal of the individual-capacity claim: Officer Helms was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that forbidding a passenger from livestreaming during a stop violated the First Amendment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Town's alleged policy banning livestreaming during traffic stops violates the First Amendment	Sharpe: the policy prohibits protected livestreaming and is not justified or narrowly tailored to officer safety	Town: officer-safety interest justifies prohibiting livestreaming because it can reveal officer location and invite intervention	Vacated district court in part; Monell claim survives pleading stage—Town has not shown the policy is sufficiently tailored; remanded
Whether Officer Helms may be held liable individually for preventing streaming (qualified immunity)	Sharpe: Helms violated a clearly established First Amendment right to livestream his own stop	Helms: no clearly established law prohibited prohibiting livestreaming during a stop; officer safety supports the action	Affirmed dismissal: qualified immunity applies because the right was not clearly established at the time
Whether livestreaming a traffic stop is protected speech	Sharpe: livestreaming disseminates information about governmental affairs and merits First Amendment protection	Defendants: livestreaming poses acute safety risks distinct from passive recording	The court held livestreaming is First Amendment–protected speech

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires an official policy or custom)
Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2011) (municipality liable only for its own violations)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (analysis for content-based speech restrictions)
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (creation and dissemination of information protected by the First Amendment)
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (recognizing strong government interest in officer safety)
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (passengers are subject to officer control during traffic stops for safety)
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (passengers are seized during traffic stops)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework: two-step inquiry)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (objective standard for qualified immunity)
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (clearly established right must be beyond debate)
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (importance of materially similar precedent for clearly established inquiries)
Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2015) (burden shifts to government to justify restrictions on protected speech)
Billups v. City of Charleston, 961 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2020) (government must produce evidence showing tailoring to interests)