Dickinson v. Cosby
B271470
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 21, 2017Background
- Janice Dickinson publicly accused Bill Cosby of raping her in 1982; Cosby, via his attorney Martin Singer, sent a confidential demand letter to media outlets and issued a public press release calling her allegation a lie.
- Dickinson sued Cosby for defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; she later filed a first amended complaint adding Singer as a defendant.
- Cosby filed an anti-SLAPP motion; while that motion was pending, the trial court struck Dickinson’s first amended complaint (as to Singer) and later granted Cosby’s anti-SLAPP motion as to the demand letter (finding it privileged) but denied it as to the press release.
- Dickinson appealed the order striking the amended complaint as to Singer and cross-appealed the grant as to the demand letter; Cosby appealed the denial as to the press release.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the striking of the first amended complaint as to Singer, held the litigation privilege did not bar the demand letter at the anti-SLAPP stage, and affirmed denial of the anti-SLAPP motion as to the press release—i.e., anti-SLAPP should not have been granted for the demand letter and was correctly denied for the press release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dickinson) | Defendant's Argument (Cosby/Singer) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. May a plaintiff amend to add a new defendant while an anti-SLAPP motion against the original defendant is pending? | Dickinson: Yes; she had a statutory right to amend under CCP § 472 to add Singer before demurrer/answer hearing. | Singer: Amendment after anti-SLAPP was filed is procedurally impermissible and prejudicial. | Reversed as to Singer: plaintiff had right to amend; striking the amendment as to a non-moving new defendant was erroneous. |
| 2. Is the demand letter protected by the absolute litigation privilege, defeating anti-SLAPP? | Dickinson: No; the litigation privilege applies only if litigation was in good faith and under serious consideration—facts show the threats were hollow. | Cosby: Yes; it was a pre-litigation communication by counsel threatening suit, thus privileged. | Reversed: Court of Appeal found prima facie evidence that the letters were bluffing (no subsequent suits); privilege did not defeat plaintiff’s probability of prevailing at anti-SLAPP stage. |
| 3. Do the demand letter and press release state provable false facts (actionable) or nonactionable opinion? | Dickinson: Both are factual denials ("a lie") capable of proof and thus actionable. | Cosby: Statements are opinion or general attacks on credibility; gist is merely that Dickinson is a liar, which is substantially true or nonactionable. | Affirmed re press release and reversed re demand letter privilege: both communications are reasonably susceptible to a defamatory factual meaning (denial of the rape), not protected pure opinion. |
| 4. Do false light and IIED causes survive the anti-SLAPP motion? | Dickinson: Yes; they arise from the same challenged statements and she has shown a probability of prevailing. | Cosby: They are redundant to defamation and should be stricken. | Held: Survive for now; not appropriately dismissed via anti-SLAPP (demurrer is proper vehicle if at all). |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (establishes two-step anti-SLAPP analysis)
- Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232 (litigation privilege and requirement that prelitigation communications be made with litigation seriously contemplated)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (statements of opinion may be actionable if they imply provably false facts)
- Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal.App.4th 1068 (policy against permitting amendment to evade anti-SLAPP after tentative adverse ruling)
- Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Servs., Inc., 122 Cal.App.4th 1049 (amendment under CCP § 472 effective but does not strip defendant of right to have pending anti-SLAPP adjudicated)
- JKC3H8 v. Colton, 221 Cal.App.4th 468 (timing of amendments vs. filing of anti-SLAPP motions)
- Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027 (opinion versus fact analysis where factual basis is fully disclosed)
- Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (libel focuses on falsity of the ‘‘gist’’ or ‘‘sting’’ of statements)
- GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, 220 Cal.App.4th 141 (anti-SLAPP standard of review and treatment of press releases vs. litigation privilege)