Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Management, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25106

Background

Carmen Llerena Diaz sued Jiten Hotel Management for multiple claims including ADEA and Massachusetts discrimination; she prevailed on a Massachusetts discrimination award of $7,650.
Diaz sought attorney's fees for the whole case; the district court reduced fees by two-thirds to exclude time spent on four dismissed/unsuccessful claims and further cut the award for Diaz's rejection of a settlement.
This court reversed the reduction based on the rejected settlement and remanded, instructing re-evaluation of the Hensley factors and adjustment of damages/costs and post-judgment interest.
On remand Diaz moved under Rule 60(a) to refine the district court’s two-thirds global deduction, arguing invoices and docket entries allowed a more precise apportionment of hours between successful and unsuccessful claims.
The district court treated the refinement as a clerical correction under Rule 60(a), reapportioned hours proportionally (reducing only hours when unsuccessful claims were still pending), and awarded approximately $93,945 in fees and $10,681.34 in costs.
Jiten appealed, arguing (1) the mandate rule barred the Rule 60(a) correction, (2) the district court failed to reconsider each Hensley factor on remand, and (3) the fee award is disproportionate to the $7,650 damages.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court exceeded the appellate mandate by using Rule 60(a) to alter its prior two-thirds deduction	Diaz argued the court intended to exclude only hours spent on unsuccessful claims and that invoices permit a more precise correction; Rule 60(a) could fix the clerical/oversight error	Jiten argued the appellate mandate foreclosed reconsideration and that Rule 60(a) cannot be used to change legal determinations affirmed on appeal	Court: Mandate did not implicitly bar a clerical correction; Rule 60(a) may be used on remand to correct an oversight so long as the appellate court did not expressly or implicitly decide the issue
Whether the district court complied with the mandate to re-evaluate the Hensley factors	Diaz contended the court re-took its prior analysis as a starting point and saw no basis for further adjustment	Jiten contended the court failed to enumerate and re-assess each Hensley factor as ordered	Court: District court adequately considered the factors by adopting its earlier reasoned analysis as the starting point and declining further changes; explicit factor-by-factor recitation was not required
Whether the fee award was unreasonable because it was disproportionate to the small damages recovered	Diaz argued fee-shifting under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.151B compensates counsel fully and vindicates public rights; proportionality to damages is not dispositive	Jiten argued large fees relative to $7,650 verdict are disproportionate and justify vacatur	Court: Under Massachusetts law and fee-shifting principles, proportionality to damages alone is not controlling; no abuse of discretion shown in awarding full compensation for reasonable hours devoted to the prevailing claim

Key Cases Cited

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (fee-award lodestar and adjustment factors)
Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 720 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (chapter 151B fees not tied solely to damages)
Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 111 F.3d 205 (1st Cir. 1997) (mandate rule bars reconsideration of appellate determinations)
Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383 (1st Cir. 1991) (Rule 60(a) corrections are generally mechanical)
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (fee-shifting serves public interest in vindicating statutory rights)
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (finality concerns relating to post-judgment corrections)
United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1993) (scope of mandate rule)