Diaz-Carrasquillo v. Garcia-Padilla
750 F.3d 7
1st Cir.2014Background
- Díaz-Carrasquillo sues the Governor and officials after 2013 laws abolished his position as Disabilities Advocate under Reorganization Plan No. 1-2011.
- Act 75 (2013) repealed the Plan; Act 78 reestablished an Office of the Ombudsman for Persons with Disabilities and gave the Governor appointment authority for a ten-year term.
- Díaz was appointed Disabilities Advocate on November 15, 2011; no record of performance issues.
- On August 28, 2013 Díaz was informed that, under Acts 75 and 78, an Acting Ombudsman had been appointed and his Advocate position abolished.
- The district court granted a temporary restraining order, found potential quasi-judicial nature of the role, and noted irreparable harm from removal.
- The First Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that the Advocate position was lawfully abolished and that the district court erred in issuing the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the Advocate position abolished by the 2013 legislation? | Díaz argues the position remained, or that abolition was not explicit. | García argues the Plan was repealed and the Ombudsman office created, abolishing the Advocate. | Abolition valid; Plan repeal eliminated the Advocate position. |
| Did Díaz have any property or due process rights in the Advocate position? | The position conferred a property right and due process required removal for cause with a hearing. | There was no property interest; legislative action could abolish the office with due process via process provided by law. | No protected property right; due process satisfied by legislative process. |
| Does Article 20 save Díaz from abolition by excluding his position from saving provisions? | Saving provisions could preserve Díaz's position. | Exclusion shows legislative intent not to save Díaz. | Expressio unius est exclusio alterius; Díaz not saved by saving provisions. |
| Can federal courts enjoin or restrain Puerto Rico's legislative restructuring of offices? | Federal court should protect Díaz's quasi-judicial role from abolition. | Federal courts provide no constraint on legitimate state legislature actions. | Court vacates injunction; declines to restrain legislative restructuring. |
Key Cases Cited
- Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (distinguishes removal from appointment issues in federal cases)
- Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (limits on congressional removal protections; relevant to appointment/removal analysis)
- Gómez v. Negrón Fernández, 65 P.R.R. 286 (1945) (Legislature may abolish positions; historical Puerto Rico authority)
- Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134 (1917) (repeal of an act creating an office abolishes it)
- Brame v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 252 (1986) (abolition of nonconstitutional offices by legislature)
- Abt v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 205 (1959) (abolition and congressional power over offices)
- Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1939) (state legislature may create or abolish offices)
- Bastian v. Kennedy, 829 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (legislature exercises power to abolish nonconstitutional offices)
- New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (framework for evaluating preliminary injunctions on four factors)
- Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 33 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1994) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius applied to legislative saving provisions)
- Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003) (statutory interpretation maxim used to infer exclusions)
