Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 466 Mass. 655

Background

In 1981, 17-year-old Gregory Diatchenko murdered Thomas Wharf; Diatchenko was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced under G. L. c. 265, § 2 to life without parole. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and became final.
In 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, holding mandatory life without parole for offenders under 18 violates the Eighth Amendment because it forecloses consideration of youth-related mitigating characteristics.
In 2013 Diatchenko sought relief in state court asking that Miller apply retroactively and that Massachusetts law be declared unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.
The SJC addressed (1) whether Miller is retroactive on collateral review, (2) whether Massachusetts’ mandatory statutory parole bar for first-degree murder conflicts with Miller and state constitutional protections, and (3) appropriate remedy for Diatchenko and similarly situated juveniles.
The court concluded Miller announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on collateral review, invalidated the statute’s parole-exception as applied to offenders under 18, and held that discretionary imposition of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Retroactivity of Miller on collateral review	Miller announced a rule that must apply retroactively to juveniles serving mandatory LWOP	Miller broke new ground and should not apply retroactively to final cases except under narrow exceptions	Miller is a new substantive rule and is retroactive on collateral review
Constitutional validity of mandatory LWOP under G. L. c. 265, § 2	Mandatory LWOP for offenders <18 violates Eighth Amendment and art. 26 as it forecloses consideration of youth	Statute valid when enacted; prior precedent did not forbid mandatory LWOP for juveniles	Mandatory statutory imposition of LWOP for <18 violates Eighth Amendment and art. 26
Validity of discretionary LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders under art. 26	Even discretionary LWOP is disproportionate for juveniles given developmental science; parole possibility required	State may impose severe penalties; legislature has latitude to define punishments	Discretionary imposition of LWOP (i.e., denying any possibility of parole) for <18 offenders violates art. 26; juveniles must have meaningful parole opportunity
Appropriate remedy for those sentenced under the invalid parole bar	Invalidate parole-exception; allow parole consideration rather than automatic resentencing	Commonwealth argued alternate procedures or limits on relief; CPCS representation challenged	Severed the parole-ineligibility language as applied to juveniles, making them immediately eligible for parole consideration; life sentence otherwise remains

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for offenders under 18 violates Eighth Amendment because it precludes consideration of youth-related mitigating factors)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; juveniles are constitutionally different from adults)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment bars death penalty for offenders under 18; recognized diminished culpability of juveniles)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for determining whether new constitutional rules apply retroactively on collateral review)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishes substantive rules, which are retroactive, from new procedural rules)
Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, 387 Mass. 718 (1982) (direct-appeal decision affirming conviction and rejecting Eighth/State constitutional challenge to mandatory sentencing)
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980) (interpreting art. 26 to provide at least protections comparable to the Eighth Amendment; death penalty unconstitutional under art. 26)