Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District Commonwealth v. Roberio
471 Mass. 12
| Mass. | 2015Background
- In Diatchenko I (466 Mass. 655 (2013)) the SJC held that mandatory life without parole for offenders who were juveniles when they committed homicide is unconstitutional and that such offenders must have a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” (parole consideration).
- Gregory Diatchenko and Jeffrey S. Roberio (both convicted as juveniles of murder and now parole-eligible after Diatchenko I) sought additional procedural protections for their initial parole hearings: appointed counsel if indigent, public funding for experts, and judicial review if parole is denied.
- The parole board conducts initial life-sentence parole hearings and may consider extensive confidential and evaluative materials; attorneys may appear but indigent representation and expert funding were not statutorily provided for parole hearings.
- Petitioners argued that because parole eligibility is constitutionally required to make the juvenile life sentence proportionate under art. 26, the initial parole hearing acquires a constitutional dimension requiring certain due-process protections.
- The Commonwealth (board, commissioner, district attorney) argued separation-of-powers limits, that parole hearings are executive discretion, and that existing statutory/regulatory mechanisms and board guideline changes suffice; they opposed a right to appointed counsel, mandatory expert funding, and expanded judicial review.
- The SJC majority (lead opinion) answered the reported questions largely in favor of petitioners: indigent juvenile homicide offenders are entitled to counsel at the initial parole hearing, may obtain court-authorized funds for experts in limited circumstances, and may seek limited certiorari review of an initial parole denial (abuse-of-discretion standard focused on consideration of youth-related factors).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to counsel at initial parole hearing | Diatchenko/Roberio: appointed counsel is necessary for indigent juvenile homicide offenders to have a meaningful opportunity to obtain release given complexity and stakes. | Board/Comm./DA: parole is executive, not sentencing; no protected liberty interest; existing processes suffice; no Sixth Amendment right. | Held: Indigent juvenile homicide offenders are entitled to counsel for the initial parole hearing; CPCS may appoint under G. L. c. 211D, §5. |
| Public funding for expert witnesses for parole hearing | Petitioners: experts (neuropsych, developmental) may be necessary to explain youth-related culpability and present rehabilitation/risk evidence; funding essential for meaningful opportunity. | Commonwealth: statutes for expert funding apply to court proceedings not parole; rule 30(c)(5) inapplicable; funding is a legislative prerogative. | Held: Superior Court judges may, under G. L. c. 261 §§27A–27G (construed), authorize expert fees for indigent juvenile homicide offenders for the initial parole hearing when reasonably necessary to protect the meaningful opportunity to obtain release. |
| Judicial review of parole denial | Petitioners: certiorari is required to ensure board considered youth-related factors; review is necessary to protect art. 26 rights. | Commonwealth: art. 30 separation of powers prohibits such review; declaratory actions under ch. 231A are adequate; certiorari risks intruding on executive discretion. | Held: Limited judicial review via certiorari is available in the Superior Court (abuse-of-discretion standard). Review is confined to whether the board constitutionally exercised discretion by adequately considering the distinctive attributes of youth; remedy is remand, not substitution of judgment. |
| Scope/applicability of protections | Petitioners: protections necessary for all juvenile homicide offenders and not limited to those whose sentences were altered post-Miller. | Commonwealth: Diatchenko I simply removed statutory bar to parole; existing parole procedures suffice for all inmates. | Held: Protections apply generally to juvenile offenders convicted of murder (initial parole hearing); apply to first- and, per companion decision Okoro, second-degree juvenile homicide offenders serving mandatory life. |
Key Cases Cited
- Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (Mass. 2013) (held mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates art. 26 and requires meaningful parole opportunity)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (Eighth Amendment bars mandatory life-without-parole for juvenile homicide offenders)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (juveniles entitled to meaningful opportunity for release; life without parole for nonhomicide juveniles unconstitutional)
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1979) (parole statutes may create a protectible expectancy and limited due process, but generally no inherent federal liberty interest in parole)
- Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1 (Mass. 1979) (appointed counsel required where complexity and stakes make meaningful hearing impossible without counsel)
- Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294 (Mass. 2014) (parole is an executive function; judicial interference is limited to ensuring constitutional exercise of discretion)