Diane Zion v. Samuel Nassan, 556 F. App'x 103

Plaintiffs bring § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims against Trooper Nassan, Terrance Donnelly, and supervisory officials for the shooting death of Nicholas Haniotakis in Pittsburgh.
Haniotakis’s SUV was followed for a short period; after a minor collision he continued moving slowly, and the officers fired, killing him.
District Court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding they were not entitled to qualified immunity at that stage.
The district court’s decision rested on whether the alleged facts, if true, show a constitutional violation and were not clearly established as requiring deadly force given the circumstances.
The plaintiffs allege Nassan’s prior violent propensities and supervisory knowledge/inaction, seeking supervisory liability under § 1983.
The Third Circuit has jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings; this is an interlocutory appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jurisdiction over interlocutory immunity review	Plaintiffs contend no jurisdiction exists under Johnson v. Jones.	Defendants argue Johnson forecloses interlocutory review of sufficiency questions at this stage.	The court holds jurisdiction exists; decision was on a legal issue, not evidence sufficiency.
Whether the officers’ use of deadly force was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment	If true, facts show no dangerous threat; Abraham requires liability, so qualified immunity does not apply.	Garner framework supports qualified immunity when danger to officers/public is not clearly established.	Plaintiffs plead a Fourth Amendment violation; the district court erred in granting immunity at the pleadings stage.
Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity under post-Abraham developments	Abraham remains good law; Brosseau/Scott do not negate its application given pleadings.	Brosseau/Scott may undermine Abraham as clearly establishing law.	Abraham remains controlling; Brosseau/Scott do not defeat clearly established law given the pleadings.
Supervisory liability for Nassan's supervisors	Supervisors knew of Nassan’s violent propensity and failed to train or intervene.	No basis shown that supervisors violated clearly established standards.	Supervisory defendants are also liable; prior clearly established norms supported supervisor liability.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force limited when no immediate threat; not always permissible to stop escape)
Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999) (shooting fleeing, non-dangerous suspects may be unconstitutional; fact-pattern guidance)
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (pre-Abraham; qualified immunity uncertain when facts vary across cases)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (high-speed chase; danger evaluation; distinctions from Garner applicability)
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004) (supervisor liability for subordinate constitutional violations when knowledge and acquiescence are shown)
Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (continues to treat Abraham as good law and relevance to excessive force)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (clarity required in clearly established law for qualified immunity)
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (limits appellate review of district court’s sufficiency-based immunity decisions)
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (standard for ruling on pleading sufficiency; not a basis for jurisdiction issue here)
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012) (post-Iqbal framework for review of qualified immunity defenses)