Diana Glazer v. State of Arizona, 237 Ariz. 160

In 2007, Glazer’s vehicle collided with an oncoming car after crossing an 84-foot dirt median on I-10 due to the absence of a median barrier.
Glazer sued the State, alleging failure to install a median barrier constituting negligence in maintaining safe roadways.
The State moved for summary judgment under A.R.S. § 12-820.03, arguing immunity if the plan/design conformed to then-accepted standards and warnings were provided for unreasonably dangerous hazards.
The trial court held § 12-820.03 did not apply because the claim focused on conditions in 2007, not the 1967 design, and denied JMOL.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding § 12-820.03 inapplicable because the injury did not arise from the 1967 construction plan, prompting Supreme Court review.
The Supreme Court held § 12-820.03 is available when material changes render a plan/subsequent roadway feature substandard, but the State failed to prove the warning requirement and the hazard was not conclusively non-dangerous.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 12-820.03 applies after material travel changes	Glazer contends the defense does not apply to injuries from modern conditions.	State contends the defense applies if the plan/design conformed to standards and warnings given.	Yes, the defense can apply despite material changes.
Whether the State proved the warning proviso of § 12-820.03	Glazer argues warnings were not provided for an unreasonably dangerous hazard.	State argues warnings were given or could have been provided.	No, the State did not prove the warning requirement as a matter of law.
Whether the plan/designer conformed to generally accepted standards	Glazer contends the design was inherently unsafe due to the missed barrier.	State contends the design conformed to standards then in effect.	Yes, the State established the conformance element.
Whether the open median constituted an unreasonably dangerous hazard	Glazer asserts the lack of barrier created an unreasonably dangerous condition due to post-design changes.	State contends the hazard was not unreasonably dangerous or warnings would suffice.	A reasonable jury could find it dangerous; the State did not prove no warning was possible.

Hegel v. O’Malley Ins. Co., 122 Ariz. 52 (1979) (establishes burden on proponent of affirmative defense)
Bach v. State, 152 Ariz. 145 (App. 1986) (unreasonably dangerous condition standard in context of defense)
Edwards v. Bd. of Supervisors, 229 P.3d 233 (Ariz. App. 2010) (warning requirement analysis under § 12-820.03)
Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 24 P.3d 1269 (2001) (statutory interpretation guiding narrow construction)
Dunham v. Pima County, 778 P.2d 1200 (Ariz. 1989) (common-law duty to keep roadways reasonably safe)
Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178 (Ariz. 1990) (statutory Immunity framework under Act)
Orme School v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. 1990) (summary judgment standard applied in JMOL context)
Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 381 P.2d 107 (Ariz. 1963) (abolition of sovereign immunity for tort liability)