Diamond Blair v. Roger Terry
929 F.3d 981
8th Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiff Diamond Blair, serving life in Missouri, was stabbed by inmate Qusai Mahasin on April 7, 2015 after arriving at SCCC general population.
- After the attack Blair was placed in single-cell administrative segregation (Ad-Seg) pending investigation; he received a conduct violation for fighting and a transfer hold was placed.
- Blair told Deputy Warden Roger Terry he feared someone had a “hit” on him and asked for protective custody or transfer; Terry indicated protective custody was not an option and initially kept Blair in Ad-Seg.
- Classification reviews and recorded interviews show Blair at times declined or waived protective custody (reportedly to avoid prolonged Ad-Seg), and an investigator released the transfer hold in early June.
- Terry ordered a special review and Blair was returned to general population on June 5 without a signed paperwork trail; two days later Blair suffered a second, severe attack by a different inmate.
- Blair sued Terry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference; after a jury trial the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for Terry, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Terry knew of an objective substantial risk of serious harm to Blair if returned to general population | Blair told Terry someone had a "hit" on him and his fear was obvious from his statements | Terry knew the attacker was secured, investigation was inconclusive, and Blair gave no identities or concrete threats | Held: Blair's statements were speculative and insufficient to show knowledge of a specific substantial risk |
| Whether Terry acted with deliberate indifference in approving Blair's return | Approving return despite Blair's warnings and incomplete investigation amounts to conscious disregard | At most negligence; no evidence Terry drew the inference of a substantial risk or acted recklessly | Held: No deliberate indifference; evidence cannot support a jury finding for Blair |
| Whether failure to complete the investigation before release shows culpable state of mind | Investigation unfinished; Terry lacked full information and still approved return | Lack of motive or known enemies meant unfinished investigation did not establish known risk | Held: Unfinished investigation does not prove Terry ‘‘must have known’’ of a risk; negligence only |
| Whether Blair’s waivers/declinations preclude liability | Blair claims he declined PC only to shorten Ad-Seg and because Terry told him PC wouldn’t be granted | Defendants point to written waivers, hearing forms, and recorded statements where Blair disclaimed need for PC | Held: Record supports that Blair repeatedly declined PC; his strategic statements undermine claim of unambiguous requests for protection |
Key Cases Cited
- Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1998) (standards for reviewing JMOL and resolving conflicting evidence in favor of nonmovant)
- Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2015) (elements and subjective standard for deliberate indifference failure-to-protect claims)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference requires actual or inferred knowledge of substantial risk; constructive knowledge insufficient)
- Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444 (8th Cir. 1996) (vague, unsubstantiated fears do not establish an identifiable serious risk warranting protective custody)
- Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1994) (generalized fear for safety without specifics does not compel protective placement)
- Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (unsupported conjecture or negligence is insufficient to prove deliberate indifference)
- Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2017) (deliberate indifference requires a highly culpable state of mind akin to criminal recklessness)