Dharminder Vir Sen v. State, 390 P.3d 769

In 2009, 15-year-old Dharminder Sen participated in a burglary during which he shot and killed Robert Ernst; he was convicted of first-degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy.
Sen initially received life "according to law" (effectively LWOP), plus long consecutive terms; the Wyoming Supreme Court vacated and remanded after Miller v. Alabama required individualized juvenile sentencing.
On resentencing the district court held a Miller-compliant hearing, imposed life with parole eligibility tied to statutory amendments, and structured sentences so the aggravated burglary term runs consecutively, producing ~35 years before parole eligibility.
Parties stipulated to a second remand after Wyoming amended juvenile parole statutes to make juveniles eligible for parole after 25 years; on final resentencing Sen’s earliest parole eligibility was set at about 35 years overall.
Sen challenged (1) that his aggregate sentence is a de facto LWOP in violation of the Eighth Amendment and (2) that his aggravated burglary sentence (10–25 years) is grossly disproportionate.

Issue	Sen's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Sen’s aggregate sentence is a de facto life without parole violative of the Eighth Amendment	Aggregate 35-year parole ineligibility is functionally equivalent to LWOP and unconstitutional under Miller/Graham	Legislature’s 25-year parole rule governs single life terms only; courts may impose consecutive terms that produce >25 years before parole eligibility	Rejected — 35-year aggregate ineligibility is not a de facto LWOP and does not violate the Eighth Amendment
Whether the aggravated burglary sentence (10–25 years) is grossly disproportionate	10–25 years is excessive given the offense; should run concurrent with murder sentence; court failed to consider youth	Sentence is within statutory range; court permissibly considered related conduct (use of gun, homicide) and Sen’s juvenile status at sentencing	Rejected — sentence within statutory range, not grossly disproportionate; court considered youth and rehabilitative evidence

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (juvenile LWOP procedures require individualized sentencing)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juvenile non-homicide offenders must have meaningful opportunity for release)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (Miller announced substantive rule, retroactive; rare juveniles whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility may receive LWOP)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (proportionality factors for Eighth Amendment review)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (Solem analysis limited to rare extreme cases)
Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (aggregate lengthy sentences may be de facto LWOP; courts must consider entire sentencing package)
Sen v. State, 301 P.3d 106 (Wyo. 2013) (remanding for Miller-based resentencing)
State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487 (Wyo. 2014) (2013 statutory amendments apply retroactively to juvenile life sentences)