Dewayne Bearchild v. Kristy Cobban
947 F.3d 1130
| 9th Cir. | 2020Background
- Inmate Dewayne Bearchild sued MSP guard Sgt. Larry Pasha under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment sexual assault occurred during a pat‑down search. Most defendants were dismissed; case proceeded against Pasha to a jury trial with Bearchild pro se.
- At trial Bearchild testified Pasha rubbed, squeezed, and groped his groin, asked him to pull his waistband, stared at his penis, and joked with other guards; an inmate eyewitness (Ball) gave generally consistent testimony. Pasha denied abuse and demonstrated a more invasive but legitimate search for contraband.
- The district court declined to subpoena a non‑prison staff eyewitness (GED teacher Sara Simmons) when Bearchild failed to comply with service and witness fee rules; two inmate witnesses were produced by video; Simmons had produced two written statements but they were not introduced at trial.
- The court instructed the jury using Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions for § 1983 causation and Eighth Amendment excessive force (Instructions 10 & 12) and, at Pasha’s request, an instruction defining “sexual abuse” from PREA (Instruction 13). Bearchild did not object to the instructions at trial.
- The jury returned a verdict for Pasha. On appeal the Ninth Circuit addressed (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte continuing trial to allow subpoenas, and (2) whether the jury instructions misstates the law for Eighth Amendment sexual‑assault claims. The court affirmed the continuance ruling but reversed and remanded for a new trial because Instruction No. 12 mischaracterized legal elements for sexual‑assault Eighth Amendment claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by not granting a sua sponte continuance to allow Bearchild to subpoena GED teacher Simmons | Bearchild: Simmons was the key non‑inmate eyewitness and the court should have given time to cure service and fee defects; denial prejudiced his ability to present his case | Pasha: District court mitigated by ordering two inmate witnesses via video; Simmons’s written statements existed and Pasha did not object; Bearchild elected to proceed | No abuse of discretion — court reasonably managed trial schedule, produced inmate witnesses by video, and Bearchild failed to show prejudice |
| Whether Instruction No. 12 (model excessive‑force instruction) correctly stated the law for Eighth Amendment claims based on sexual assault | Bearchild: Model instruction imposed extra elements (e.g., apparent need/amount of force, injury) and failed to tell jury that proof of sexual assault alone satisfies the Eighth Amendment subjective and objective components | Pasha: The model instruction was appropriate; Instruction No. 13 (PREA definition of sexual abuse) supplemented and cured any ambiguity; no prejudice because evidence favored defendant | Reversed and remanded for a new trial — Instruction No. 12 misstated law: sexual assault need not show physical injury or degree of force, and proof of sexual assault (absent penological justification) satisfies malicious/sadistic element |
| Whether Instruction No. 10 (causation) misstated § 1983 causation requirements | Bearchild: Instruction added an unnecessary causation element | Pasha: Instruction appropriate; causation is required in § 1983 claims | No plain error — Instruction No. 10 was an acceptable proximate‑causation statement and did not plainly err |
| Standard for an Eighth Amendment sexual‑assault claim and necessary jury instruction content | Bearchild: Jury should have been instructed that touching of a sexual nature by staff, without legitimate penological justification, by definition satisfies the Eighth Amendment elements (no injury required) | Pasha: Proper instruction permits jury to evaluate need, amount of force, and intent; model instruction sufficient | Court clarified controlling standard: a prisoner states an Eighth Amendment claim by proving a staff member, without penological justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or engaged in sexual conduct to gratify, humiliate, or degrade — such proof satisfies subjective and objective components; jury instructions must reflect this rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (establishes excessive‑force Eighth Amendment test: subjective malicious‑and‑sadistic intent and objective harm contextual inquiry)
- Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (prisoner sexual abuse by staff violates the Eighth Amendment and no lasting physical injury is required)
- Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (sexual contact between guard and inmate serves no penological purpose; proof of sexual assault satisfies the malicious/sadistic element)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as an Eighth Amendment category — cited for Eighth Amendment framework)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment and lack of penological justification; duty to protect inmates and standards for deliberate indifference)
- Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (Eighth Amendment objective seriousness requirement remains contextual)