Derrick Steilman v. Reginald Michael
859 Fed. Appx. 123
| 9th Cir. | 2021Background
- In 1999, Derrick E. Steilman committed a homicide in Montana shortly before his 18th birthday, pleaded guilty, and received a 110-year sentence without parole.
- Steilman challenged that sentence under the Eighth Amendment after the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama (2012), which requires individualized juvenile sentencing review for life-without-parole sentences for minors.
- The Montana Supreme Court (Steilman v. Michael) held that Steilman’s Montana sentence was not a de facto life sentence because of good-time credit and a concurrent Washington sentence, meaning he potentially faced about 31 years for the Montana homicide.
- Steilman filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 within one year of Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) but four years after Miller (2012).
- The district court dismissed the § 2254 petition as untimely; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding Miller—not Montgomery—triggers the one-year limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(C), and Steilman was not entitled to equitable tolling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which Supreme Court decision triggers the one‑year filing period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) for a newly recognized right? | Steilman: filing within one year of Montgomery is timely. | State: Miller is the decision that initially recognized the right; the limitations period runs from Miller. | Held: Miller triggers the limitations period; petition untimely. |
| Does Montgomery’s retroactivity date reset or start the § 2244(d)(1)(C) one‑year clock? | Steilman: Montgomery’s retroactive application should control timeliness. | State: Montgomery only made Miller retroactive; the date of retroactivity does not govern the limitations clock. | Held: Montgomery does not restart the clock; Dodd and Jones confirm retroactivity date is irrelevant for § 2244(d)(1)(C). |
| Is Steilman entitled to equitable tolling based on alleged attorney abandonment/misadvice and other barriers? | Steilman: counsel abandoned and misadvised him; other barriers existed while incarcerated. | State: Steilman offered no evidence of an extraordinary circumstance or diligence; alleged misconduct occurred after limitations lapsed. | Held: Equitable tolling denied—no extraordinary circumstance or proof of diligence. |
| Must the court resolve whether the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling conflicted with Miller on the merits? | Steilman: state court failed to apply Miller’s protections to his de facto life sentence claim. | State: state court’s factual conclusions and credit/concurrency analysis foreclose a de facto life determination. | Held: Court declined to decide the merits because the petition was untimely. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (recognized Eighth Amendment rule requiring individualized juvenile sentencing review before life without parole)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (held Miller applies retroactively on collateral review)
- Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (clarified Montgomery did not expand Miller’s requirements)
- Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005) (date of retroactivity is irrelevant for § 2244(d)(1)(C) limitations)
- Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (equitable tolling requires diligence and an extraordinary circumstance)
- Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (equitable tolling is rarely granted)
- Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (attorney negligence generally insufficient for tolling)
- Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313 (Mont. 2017) (state supreme court held Steilman’s Montana sentence not a de facto life sentence)