60 F.4th 1124
8th Cir.2023Background
- Police stopped Derek Westwater after an outstanding warrant; he fled, was captured, handcuffed, and placed in the passenger side of Captain Kevin Church’s squad car.
- Church knew Westwater had previously assaulted an officer (Officer Hymes) and knew Westwater had fled earlier during the stop.
- At the station, Church ordered Westwater to exit; the parties’ accounts diverge: Church says Westwater threatened and lunged, then Church swung twice and hit the back of Westwater’s neck once; Westwater says Church struck him at least five times in the back of the head while he was handcuffed and trying to exit.
- A security camera recorded before/after but not the struggle; other officers and firefighters responded; Westwater later pleaded guilty to criminal harassment for threats made after being placed in a cell.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Church, finding the force objectively reasonable and that Church had qualified immunity; the Eighth Circuit reverses and remands, holding genuine disputed facts preclude resolution of excessive-force and qualified-immunity issues and therefore reversing dismissal of pendent Iowa assault-and-battery claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the force used by Church objectively reasonable (Fourth Amendment excessive force)? | Westwater: he was handcuffed, compliant or only passively resistant, could not flee, and was struck multiple times in the back of the head — force was unconstitutional. | Church: Westwater threatened him, referenced prior assault on an officer, lunged and threatened a head-butt while exiting, and posed a flight/threat risk justifying force. | Reversed district court — genuine disputed facts about threats, movements, and amount of force prevent resolution on summary judgment; reasonableness is for factfinder. |
| Is Church entitled to qualified immunity (was the right clearly established on May 1, 2018)? | Westwater: pre-2018 precedent put Church on notice that using more-than-de minimis force on a nonthreatening, nonfleeing detainee is unlawful. | Church: prior decisions drew fine lines; given Westwater’s threats, flight risk, and prior assault, a reasonable officer could believe force was lawful. | Reversed — because factual disputes exist, court cannot decide clearly-established issue on summary judgment; may be no immunity if Westwater’s version is credited. |
| Do Westwater’s pendent Iowa assault and battery claims survive? | Same facts supporting § 1983 claim show state-law misuse of force; Iowa law uses objective-reasonableness standard. | Church contended state claims failed for the same reasons as the § 1983 claim. | Reversed dismissal — remanded for further consideration under Iowa law because federal claims cannot be resolved on summary judgment. |
| Was summary judgment appropriate given the record and controlling-law standards? | Westwater: disputed material facts (threats, number of strikes, ability to flee) require trial credibility determinations. | Church: his testimony and circumstances justify summary judgment for reasonableness and immunity. | Reversed — court must view disputed facts in light most favorable to Westwater; credibility disputes preclude granting summary judgment on core legal questions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (establishes Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness excessive-force standard)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (U.S. 2018) (qualified-immunity inquiry requires closely matching precedent)
- Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (clarity required to show right clearly established in excessive-force contexts)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (U.S. 2014) (on summary judgment courts must view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 (U.S. 2017) (balancing governmental and individual interests in reasonableness inquiry)
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (U.S. 2015) (objective standard for force claims by detained persons)
- Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2014) (precedent on de minimis force and its limits)
- Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2012) (examples distinguishing de minimis force from actionable force)