646 F.Supp.3d 174
D. Mass.2022Background
- Nancy Der Sarkisian, a longtime Austin Prep English teacher (employed ~1996–2019), was 70 at filing; she taught in-person and never taught remotely.
- In 2019 she underwent multiple hip surgeries, exhausted FMLA and sick days, and applied for the school’s new long-term disability plan, listing an uncertain return date.
- Her treating physician reported she was on “total temporary disability,” could not walk/stand/drive, and needed 3–6 months (or more); he suggested no workplace accommodations beyond disability leave.
- Austin Prep asked for an Accommodation Request Inquiry Form to evaluate reasonable accommodations; after reviewing the physician’s responses and her open‑ended recovery timeline, the school terminated her on December 26, 2019, citing a need to fill the position and unwillingness to provide an open‑ended leave.
- Der Sarkisian sued under the ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (disability and age claims). The court considered cross‑motions on summary judgment and granted judgment for Austin Prep.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Der Sarkisian was a "qualified individual" under the ADA / ch.151B (ability to perform essential functions) | Der Sarkisian argued she had requisite skills and sought extended leave as accommodation to enable return | Austin Prep argued regular in‑person attendance was an essential function and she could not perform it or give a return date | Court: Not qualified — attendance is essential and she could not perform it at termination |
| Whether additional/open‑ended leave was a reasonable accommodation / whether employer failed interactive process | Der Sarkisian contends Austin Prep failed to meaningfully engage and should have extended leave | Austin Prep argues it provided initial accommodation (leave), solicited medical input, and was not required to grant indefinite leave absent a concrete return date or feasible accommodation | Court: No reasonable accommodation shown; open‑ended leave not reasonable; employer satisfied interactive process request by obtaining physician input |
| Whether termination was discriminatory under Mass. ch.151B (age) — pretext | Der Sarkisian points to a younger teacher who got a longer leave and other alleged incidents involving older staff to show pretext | Austin Prep says termination was due to inability to return within a feasible timeframe; similarly situated comparators are not "apples to apples"; no age‑based comments or animus | Court: No pretext shown; comparators not sufficiently similar; summary judgment for Austin Prep |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Brader v. Biogen Inc., 983 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2020) (discussing proof of discriminatory animus and pretext under ADA)
- García‑Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2000) (elements of "qualified individual" and reasonable accommodation analysis)
- Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001) (employee must request reasonable accommodation with sufficient specificity)
- Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharma. LP, 856 F.3d 119 (1st Cir. 2017) (interactive‑process obligations and employee cooperation)
- Henry v. United Bank, 686 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (open‑ended leave requests can be unreasonable)
- Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998) (examples when leave extension may be reasonable)
- Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 24 (Mass. 2016) (Massachusetts law as "pretext only" jurisdiction for discrimination claims)