Deputy Corey Alexander and Sergeant Jimmie Cook v. April Walker, 435 S.W.3d 789

Background

April Walker sued two Harris County deputies (Alexander and Cook) in state court for assault, conspiracy, slander, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution arising from two arrests.
Weeks later Walker sued Harris County and the Sheriff in federal court asserting the same tort claims on vicarious-liability theories and § 1983 claims.
The deputies moved in state court for dismissal under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) election-of-remedies provisions, § 101.106(a), (b), and (f); the trial court denied the motion.
The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning Walker’s initial suit against the deputies prevented the later county suit from barring the deputies under subsection (a).
The Texas Supreme Court granted review, held the deputies’ conduct was within the scope of employment and their state-court suit was effectively an official-capacity/TTCA-type suit under § 101.106(f), and ordered dismissal of the deputies.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Walker’s state suit against deputies is treated as against the deputies in their individual capacities (triggering §101.106(a) bar).	Walker contends suing the deputies first means the later county suit is barred and her deputy suits remain viable.	Deputies argue the claims arose within scope of employment and thus are treated as official-capacity/TTCA suits, not individual-capacity suits.	Court held the suit was based on conduct within the scope of employment and thus not an individual-capacity suit for §101.106(a) purposes.
Whether the deputies’ suit could have been brought under the TTCA against the county (§101.106(f) predicate).	Walker implicitly argued TTCA inapplicability would preserve her individual claims.	Deputies argued the same torts could have been brought under the TTCA against the county (vicarious liability).	Court held the claims could have been brought under the TTCA.
Whether a suit that is effectively against an employee’s official capacity bars subsequent suit against the governmental unit under §101.106(b).	Walker (and court of appeals) read the sequence to bar the county suit from precluding the deputy suits.	Deputies relied on TAGO and §101.106(f) to show such suits are essentially against the governmental unit and do not trigger (b).	Court agreed with TAGO: an official-capacity characterization does not trigger §101.106(b) to bar government suits.
Appropriate remedy for an employee sued for conduct within scope of employment.	Walker sought to keep deputies as defendants.	Deputies requested dismissal under §101.106(f).	Court held deputies were entitled to dismissal under §101.106(f) and rendered judgment for them.

Key Cases Cited

Texas Adjutant Gen.’s Office v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. 2013) (suit against employee for acts within scope is in effect against the governmental unit; §101.106(f) dismissal).
Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (distinguishes official-capacity suits and explains when claims are treated as brought under the TTCA).
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2008) (scope-of-employment inquiry and legislative purpose to avoid duplicative litigation).
Austin State Hosp. v. Graham, 347 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. 2011) (interlocutory appeal jurisdiction under §51.014(a)(5)).
Fontenot v. Stinson, 369 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (conflicting court of appeals decision noted).
City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994) (distinguishing official immunity inquiry from TTCA scope inquiry).