Department of Civil Rights v. Countryside Townhouses
327176
| Mich. Ct. App. | Oct 11, 2016Background
- Countryside Townhouses, a subsidized apartment complex, had a longstanding policy limiting occupancy to two adults per unit.
- In 2009 Barbara Smith (via the Michigan Department of Civil Rights) sought to rent one unit for herself and her two adult daughters; Countryside denied the request under the two-adults rule but offered multiple units instead.
- The Department filed a charge alleging age discrimination; an ALJ found no violation but recommended damages if the Commission disagreed.
- The Civil Rights Commission reversed, concluding the policy was facially discriminatory on the basis of age and awarded $5,000 nominal damages.
- The Oakland Circuit Court reversed the Commission, holding the policy treats all adults equally and distinguishing permissible age-based housing distinctions (esp. between adults and minors).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding the occupancy rule does not violate the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act because distinctions between adults and minors can be lawful and there was no evidence of discriminatory animus.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the two-adults-per-unit policy is facially discriminatory/"direct evidence" of age discrimination | The policy discriminates on age because it treats persons differently based on whether roommates are over/under 18; facially excludes adult children | Policy applies equally to all adults regardless of chronological age; it treats similarly situated adult groups the same | Not facially unlawful; distinction between adults and minors is permissible, so not direct evidence of illegal age animus |
| Whether Elliott-Larsen forbids occupancy limits based on age of occupants (including distinctions between adults and minors) | Elliott-Larsen bars occupancy rules that limit use on basis of age without exceptions | Beznos and related precedent allow practical distinctions between adults and minors when reasonably necessitated by children’s legal/functional differences | Allowed: Act requires similarly situated persons be treated equally; adults and minors are not always similarly situated, so some age-based occupancy rules are lawful |
| Whether Countryside’s proffered business reasons are pretext for unlawful discrimination | Commission argued proffered reasons (parking, tranquility, damage) could be addressed less restrictively, implying pretext | Countryside offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons; alternative approaches don’t prove discriminatory motive | Held: No evidence of discriminatory animus or pretext; business judgment not subject to substitutive review |
Key Cases Cited
- Hazle v Ford Motor Co., 464 Mich 456 (defines direct evidence and standard for proving discriminatory animus)
- Dep’t of Civil Rights v Beznos Corp., 421 Mich 110 (permits some age-based distinctions between children and adults in housing; ‘‘practical rule of reason’’)
- Dep’t of Civil Rights ex rel Johnson v Silver Dollar Cafe (On Remand), 198 Mich App 547 (standard of appellate review for Commission decisions)
- Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425 (recognizes special rules for children)
- Cheeseman v American Multi-Cinema Inc., 108 Mich App 428 (similar-situation principle under the civil rights act)