Dennis Sharkey v. Eral O'Neal
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2097
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff Dennis Sharkey, a wheelchair user, was required by parole agents to move from his accessible Oakland home in late 2006 and was placed in motels that lacked wheelchair-accessible features.
- Sharkey suffered multiple falls, lost in-home medical services, had surgeries canceled, and alleged ongoing harm from the relocations; he informed parole agents but no adequate accommodations were provided.
- Sharkey filed pro se suit in Sept. 2009 under Title II of the ADA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (constitutional claims); the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice as time-barred under California’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Title II claims should borrow California’s personal-injury limitations period or a different state statute’s period, and whether dismissal with prejudice was appropriate without leave to amend.
- The Ninth Circuit held Title II claims should borrow the limitations period for California Government Code § 11135 (a state statutory disability-discrimination counterpart to Title II), which is subject to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a)’s three-year statute of limitations.
- The court reversed dismissal of the ADA Title II claim (finding it timely under the three-year period) and remanded the remaining claims because the district court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice without providing leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicable statute of limitations for ADA Title II claims | Borrow the limitations period for California’s state disability-discrimination statute (§ 11135), not personal-injury period | Apply California’s two-year personal-injury limitations period | Held: Most analogous state law is Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135; borrow § 338(a) three-year period |
| Whether Title II lacks an express limitations period so federal catchall applies | Title II lacks an express period; should borrow appropriate state analogue | Defendants argued uniform application of personal-injury period across ADA titles | Held: Federal catchall (post‑1990) inapplicable; must borrow state analogue (here § 11135) |
| Appropriateness of applying § 338(a) three-year period to § 11135 claims | § 11135 is statutory, not common-law; § 338(a) applies | Defendants urged personal-injury analogue used in other contexts | Held: Under California precedent (Gatto), § 11135 claims are actions upon liability created by statute and governed by § 338(a) |
| Dismissal with prejudice and denial of leave to amend for other claims | Sharkey sought leave to amend to address statute-of-limitations defenses | Defendants did not contest limitations periods on other claims; district court dismissed with prejudice | Held: District court abused discretion by dismissing without explanation and without affording leave to amend; remand to apply Foman factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (selection of the most analogous state statute of limitations governs federal claims)
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (four-year catchall statute limited to post-1990 causes of action)
- Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (use of state limitations under 42 U.S.C. § 1988)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (factors governing leave to amend and dismissal with prejudice)
- A Society Without A Name v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 655 F.3d 342 (4th Cir.) (applying state disability‑statute limitations to ADA Title II claims)
- Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222 (4th Cir.) (analogous treatment of state disability statutes for Rehabilitation Act/ADA claims)
- Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (California precedent holding Title II counterparts are statutory and subject to § 338(a))
- Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 993 (requirement to follow state intermediate appellate decisions absent strong reason)