Dennis A. Teague v. Brad D. Schimel
2017 WI 56
Wis.2017Background
- Wisconsin DOJ maintains a centralized criminal-history Database keyed to fingerprints; it responds to public requests via fingerprint-based or name-based (WORCS) searches. Name-based searches use an algorithm and can return records tied to a "master name" or aliases.
- Name-based reports are widely used (≈900,000 requests/year) but DOJ concedes they are less reliable and includes disclaimers; DOJ issues "innocence letters" after fingerprint challenges but does not attach them to subsequent name-based reports.
- Petitioners (Teague, Colvin, Williams) are innocent but appear as aliases in others' DOJ records (due to identity theft or alias use); DOJ continues to return those third-party records in response to name-based searches on the petitioners’ names.
- Petitioners sought correction and prospective relief under Wis. Stat. § 19.70 and alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection; circuit court and court of appeals dismissed; Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded.
- Court held the name-based report produced in response to a request is a "record" containing personally identifiable information under § 19.70 and that providing a third-party's criminal history as if it pertained to an innocent petitioner makes the report inaccurate.
- Court concluded the inaccurate, recurring publication stigmatizes petitioners and, because state law makes many rights and opportunities contingent on background checks, the stigma plus statutory burdens deprived petitioners of a liberty interest; petitioners are entitled to prospective relief, remanded to determine form.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a DOJ name-based criminal-history response is a "record" subject to correction under Wis. Stat. § 19.70 | Teague: the report produced in response to a name-based search contains personally identifiable information (name as alias) and is a record that must be corrected | DOJ: the underlying Database is accurate and the returned record does not "pertain" to Teague, so § 19.70 does not apply | Held: The report is a "record" containing personally identifiable information pertaining to petitioner and § 19.70 applies (must correct or allow supplementation) |
| Whether the DOJ's production of a third party's criminal history in response to a search on an innocent person's name is inaccurate/defamatory | Teague: producing the third party's report when DOJ knows the petitioner is innocent creates a false suggestion petitioner has a criminal history | DOJ: the report accurately reflects matches to the submitted identifying data and disclaimers suffice | Held: The DOJ's action creates an inaccurate report that conveys a defamatory meaning when provided as the subject's criminal history; disclaimers are insufficient |
| Whether reputation alone triggers procedural due process or whether "stigma-plus" is required | Teague: government publication creates stigma and, because many statutory rights require background checks, the stigma impairs state-law rights (the plus) | DOJ/Dissent: reputational harm alone insufficient; circuit court found reports not literally false when fairly read; remedy is for legislature or existing statutory process | Held: Under Paul v. Davis framework the stigma combined with state-law burdens on rights/ opportunities satisfies the "plus" and deprived petitioners of a protected liberty interest |
| What process/remedy is due — is § 19.70 (and innocence letter) adequate or is prospective relief required | Teague: § 19.70 and innocence letters are inadequate (retroactive, burdensome, no notice of future recurrences); need prospective relief to prevent recurring inaccuracies | DOJ: § 19.70 provides corrective mechanism; judicial review under administrative statutes available; implements WiUPIN and caveats | Held: Mathews balancing shows existing mechanisms are inadequate; petitioners entitled to prospective relief to prevent recurring deprivations; remanded to circuit court to fashion remedy (no single form adopted by majority) |
Key Cases Cited
- Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (governmental defamation does not alone create a liberty interest under Due Process; requires additional "plus")
- Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (governmental "badge of infamy" tied to state action can trigger procedural protections)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor balancing test to determine what process is due)
- Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (scope of "liberty" includes interests such as employment prospects; state recognition can create protected interests)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice and opportunity to be heard are core due process requirements)
- Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (procedural protections guard against erroneous deprivations)
- Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (procedural due process claims are evaluated by identifying protected interest and appropriate procedures)
- Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2009) (stigma from inclusion on state list plus statutory use of list imposed tangible burdens; supports "stigma-plus" analysis)
- Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994) (inclusion on child-abuse register imposed procedural burden on employment decisions; satisfied stigma-plus)
- Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2005) (state requirement to consult central registry before hiring placed a substantial impediment on employment; stigma-plus met)