Denezpi v. United States, 596 U.S. 591

Background

In July 2017 Merle Denezpi (a Navajo member) allegedly sexually assaulted V.Y. in a house on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation.
A Bureau of Indian Affairs officer filed charges in a Court of Indian Offenses (CFR court) including an assault-and-battery count based on the Ute Mountain Ute Code; Denezpi pleaded guilty to that count and was sentenced to time served (140 days).
Six months later a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi for aggravated sexual abuse under the federal Major Crimes Act; he was convicted and sentenced to 360 months.
Denezpi moved to dismiss the federal indictment on double jeopardy grounds; the District Court and the Tenth Circuit denied relief; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The central factual-legal focus: whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions when one prosecution occurred in a CFR court enforcing a tribal ordinance (approved for enforcement in CFR court) and the later prosecution was federal under the Major Crimes Act.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Denezpi)	Defendant's Argument (United States)	Held
Whether successive federal prosecution is barred by Double Jeopardy after a prior CFR-court conviction for an overlapping tribal offense	CFR-court prosecution was effectively federal (prosecutors and court controlled by Interior), so the U.S. prosecuted him twice for the same offense; double jeopardy bars the second prosecution	The Clause forbids successive prosecutions only for the same "offence"; offenses defined by different sovereigns (tribe vs. U.S.) are distinct so successive prosecutions are permitted	Affirmed: No double jeopardy. Offenses are defined by their sovereign source; dual-sovereignty allows successive prosecutions because they are different offenses.
Whether the identity/source of the prosecutor/enforcer matters for dual-sovereignty (i.e., does it matter that CFR prosecutors are federal agents)	The dual-sovereignty rule requires separate prosecuting sovereigns; because CFR prosecutions are carried out by federal agents, both prosecutions were by the same sovereign	The Clause concerns the offence (the law violated), not who prosecutes; even if the same sovereign prosecuted both, the separate-source-of-law determines distinct offenses	Court did not decide whether CFR prosecutions are tribal or federal; held that prosecutor identity is irrelevant to the Clause—what matters is the sovereign that enacted the law defining the offence.
Does the Government’s exclusion of Major Crimes Act felonies from CFR regulatory offenses imply concession that double jeopardy would bar prosecution?	The exclusion shows the Government recognizes double jeopardy problems and concedes the second prosecution is barred	Excluding Major Crimes Act felonies from CFR regulatory offenses is a prudential administrative choice; it addresses federal-vs-federal regulatory prosecutions, not the tribe-v.-federal question here	Rejected: that administrative exclusion does not concede the constitutional issue presented here.
Do policy or structural concerns (risk of cross‑enforcement abuse) make successive prosecutions unconstitutional?	Allowing this will encourage sovereigns to “get two bites” and undermine protections; substance over form should prevent the result	The dual-sovereignty result follows from the Clause’s text; tribal sovereign interests are vindicated when tribal laws are enforced, regardless of who enforces them	Rejected as a Double Jeopardy objection; Court says any structural or due‑process objections are not resolved by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Key Cases Cited

Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. _ (text of the Double Jeopardy Clause focuses on the “offence,” not the actor)
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (dual‑sovereignty requires distinct ultimate sources of prosecutorial power)
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (tribes have inherent sovereignty; tribal and federal prosecutions can be distinct offenses)
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (sovereign defines what is an offense as an exercise of its own sovereignty)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (standard for when two statutory offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes)
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (concerns about sham or cover prosecutions; not dispositive here)