Demetre Brown v. State of Indiana
2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 143
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Late-night home invasion of a residence in Indianapolis by six men who restrained, robbed, sexually assaulted victims A.P. and E.P., shot E.P., and stole vehicles and property; the invasion lasted over two hours.
- Multiple defendants arrested; physical evidence (fingerprints, DNA, surveillance, stolen items) and co-defendant Spells’ testimony implicated Brown.
- Brown was charged with numerous felonies; tried jointly with some co-defendants; convicted on 20 counts and, because of double-jeopardy concerns, sentenced on 10 counts.
- Attorney Heather Barton (retained earlier for a different matter) took a laptop from Brown’s family home, discovered it belonged to a victim, and turned it over to police; Brown objected that this violated the attorney-client privilege.
- Trial court admitted Barton’s testimony and the laptop; Brown was convicted of multiple felonies including rape, attempted criminal deviate conduct, robbery, carjacking, and burglary and sentenced to an aggregate term (later adjusted).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Admission of former attorney’s testimony & laptop (attorney-client privilege) | State: no privileged communication occurred; Barton’s testimony concerned her actions, not confidential communications | Brown: Barton revealed information relating to representation and provided physical evidence in violation of privilege | Any error in admitting Barton’s testimony, related testimony, and the laptop was harmless given independent inculpatory evidence (surveillance, Spells’ testimony, flight) |
| 2. Single larceny rule for multiple robbery/carjacking convictions | State: victims were distinct persons and offenses separated by place/time so rule inapplicable | Brown: multiple takings should merge into single larceny per victim | Single larceny rule inapplicable: victims were different; where robbery and carjacking involved same victim, facts (different time/place/statutory violations) made crimes distinct |
| 3. Double jeopardy: Class A robbery and Class A burglary both elevated by same serious bodily injury | State concedes same injury enhanced both and concedes remedy | Brown: convictions violate double jeopardy | Court reduced the robbery conviction from Class A to Class B (adjusted sentence) to cure double jeopardy violation |
| 4. Appropriateness of aggregate sentence | State: sentence reflects horrific nature, offender history, and trial court discretion | Brown: 248-year (adjusted to 218) effectively life without parole; inappropriate | After reducing robbery to Class B (aggregate 218 years), court held sentence not inappropriate under App. R. 7(B) given offense severity and Brown’s criminal history |
Key Cases Cited
- Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (encouraging full client–lawyer communications as privilege rationale)
- Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind. 1996) (party asserting attorney-client privilege bears burden to prove relationship and confidential communication)
- Ferguson v. State, 405 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. 1980) (single larceny rule does not bar separate convictions for thefts from different victims)
- Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. 2002) (double jeopardy principles regarding enhanced offenses)
- Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 2008) (Appellate Rule 7(B) review focuses on aggregate sentence and comparative culpability)
- Curtis v. State, 42 N.E.3d 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (single larceny rule analysis where distinct statutory interests implicated)
- J.R. v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (theft from residence and taking a vehicle can be distinct offenses)
- Russell v. State, 743 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 2001) (harmless-error analysis where privileged testimony was erroneously admitted)