Delphine Henry v. Abbott Laboratories, 651 F. App'x 494

Background

Henry was a long‑time level I consumer‑relations representative (CRI) at Abbott (1999–2011) who sought promotion to level II (CRII) in 2009–2010 but was not identified for CRII training.
Abbott evaluated CRIs by call monitoring, accuracy metrics, annual reviews (EE/AE/PA/NA), and pre‑assessment surveys required for CRII eligibility; Henry had AE ratings in prior years but received a PA for 2010 after new scrutiny.
After Henry filed internal complaints and an OCRC charge alleging race discrimination (May 2010), management circulated pre‑assessment surveys (irregularly timed), increased sit‑withs, and reviewed her performance more closely; she also had documented performance issues in 2010 (SalesForce struggles; a November 2010 credential disclosure leading to suspension and written warning).
Abbott issued a 60‑day "letter of expectations" in June 2011; Henry took medical leave for stress in June and then retired in September 2011, believing she would be fired.
Henry sued (Sept. 2012) for race discrimination (failure to promote), retaliation, and constructive discharge; the district court granted Abbott summary judgment on all claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to discrimination and retaliation, affirmed on constructive discharge, and remanded the first two claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Failure to promote (race discrimination) — prima facie and pretext	Henry: She met objective qualifications (degree, AE rating, long service); similarly situated white employees (e.g., Wallis) were promoted despite similar or lesser records; management's stated reasons conflict with prior positive reviews.	Abbott: Henry lacked required pre‑assessment survey scores and had 2010 performance problems, so she was unqualified; comparator was not similarly situated.	Court: Henry raised a genuine dispute for 2009 and 2010. A jury could find she was qualified in 2009 and that Wallis was a proper comparator; evidence permits a finding of pretext. Reversed and remanded on discrimination.
Retaliation — adverse action, causation, pretext	Henry: Filing OCRC charge (protected activity) led to heightened scrutiny, lower call scores, disciplinary steps, PA rating, letter of expectations and continued training‑line placement — cumulatively materially adverse; temporal proximity and references to charge imply causation and pretext.	Abbott: Actions were justified by performance problems; plaintiff cannot show materially adverse action or causal link.	Court: Jury could find the actions were materially adverse and causally linked to the charge; evidence creates a genuine dispute on pretext. Reversed and remanded on retaliation.
Constructive discharge	Henry: Letter of expectations, discipline, humiliation and ongoing adverse treatment forced her to quit/retire.	Abbott: Criticism, PIP‑type steps, and reassignment to training do not rise to intolerable working conditions; no demonstrated intent to force resignation.	Court: Actions were insufficient to show employer deliberately created intolerable conditions intended to force resignation. Affirmed dismissal of constructive discharge.
Judicial estoppel re: bankruptcy omission	Henry: N/A — argued omission not applicable because alleged discrimination occurred after bankruptcy filing.	Abbott: Henry failed to disclose claims in Chapter 7 petition, so judicial estoppel bars claims.	Court: No estoppel — alleged promotions/discrimination occurred post‑petition, so claims were not part of the bankruptcy estate. Motion for judicial notice denied.

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination under Title VII)
Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (focus on objective qualifications at prima facie stage)
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992) (factors for assessing whether employees are similarly situated)
Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998) (Mitchell factors not rigid; focus on relevant similarities)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (retaliation adverse‑action standard: materially adverse acts that could dissuade a reasonable worker)
Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (retaliation claims require but‑for causation)
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (qualifications evidence can support an inference of pretext)
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (evidence of superior qualifications can show pretext)
Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2014) (constructive discharge standard; adverse acts that may dissuade reasonable worker)
Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (examples of adverse actions meeting low bar for retaliation)