DeLawrence King v. Donald Morgan, 807 F.3d 154

DeLawrence King was convicted in Ohio state court of two counts of murder and one count of felonious assault in 2004; sentence aggregated to 21 years to life. Direct appeal denied.
King filed a 2006 federal habeas petition that was denied; certificate of appealability was denied.
In 2009 the state trial court resentenced King to correct a sentencing defect (post-release control), entering a new judgment that increased his term to 33 years to life by imposing consecutive murder sentences.
After state remedies failed, King filed a second federal habeas petition raising seven claims: two related to the new sentence and five attacking his original convictions.
The district court dismissed the five conviction-related claims as "second or successive" under AEDPA § 2244(b); the Sixth Circuit granted COA limited to whether those conviction claims are second or successive.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the entry of a new judgment after resentencing resets the AEDPA "second or successive" rule and permits a first federal challenge to that new judgment to attack both the new sentence and the undisturbed conviction without preauthorization.

Issue	King (Plaintiff) Argument	State (Defendant) Argument	Held
Whether a federal habeas application that is the first to challenge a new state-court judgment after resentencing may attack the underlying, unchanged conviction without being treated as "second or successive" under AEDPA	Magwood’s judgment-based rule resets the count; the first petition challenging the new judgment may raise claims attacking the conviction because the new judgment intervenes	AEDPA’s purpose to limit successive petitions and pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ precedent mean conviction-related claims that could have been raised earlier should be treated as second or successive	Court held: A new judgment after resentencing resets the "second or successive" bar; the first federal petition challenging that new judgment may raise conviction-related claims without preauthorization under § 2244(b)

Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (new judgment after resentencing means the first petition challenging that judgment is not "second or successive")
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (a criminal "judgment" includes both conviction and sentence)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing punishment must be found by jury)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution suppression of exculpatory evidence violates due process)
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (AEDPA limits availability of successive petitions)
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (abuse-of-the-writ doctrine and limits on successive habeas petitions)
Lang v. United States, 474 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2007) (claims originating at resentencing are not second or successive)
Rashad v. Lafler, 675 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2012) (new judgment can reset AEDPA statute of limitations)