859 F.3d 16
D.C. Cir.2017Background
- Delaware enacted SB 135 to limit nonessential nighttime idling of locomotives in residential areas, with specified safety and operational exceptions and civil fines for violations.
- Norfolk Southern petitioned the Surface Transportation Board (STB) for a declaratory order that SB 135 is preempted by the ICCTA (49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)).
- Norfolk Southern submitted an operations declaration explaining several routine reasons locomotives must idle (air-line maintenance, operational contingencies, cold-weather protection).
- The STB granted declaratory relief, concluding SB 135 categorically preempts state regulation because it "directly manages and governs" locomotive operations and substitutes state judgment for railroad operational decisions; it alternatively found as-applied preemption due to discretion given to local officers.
- Delaware challenged the Board’s order, arguing SB 135 is a traditional, narrowly tailored public-health regulation within state police powers and does not regulate rail "transportation" under the ICCTA.
- The D.C. Circuit denied review, holding SB 135 regulates rail transportation by restricting locomotive operation and is therefore categorically preempted under the ICCTA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Delaware) | Defendant's Argument (STB / Norfolk Southern) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SB 135 is categorically preempted by the ICCTA | SB 135 is a traditional public‑health police power measure, narrowly tailored and not regulating rail transportation | SB 135 directly governs locomotive operations (idling) and thus regulates rail transportation | Court: SB 135 is categorically preempted because it regulates locomotive operation, an element of "transportation" under the ICCTA |
| Whether the statute is only incidental to transportation because it targets non‑movement | The statute targets non‑movement (idling) and therefore does not regulate movement/transportation | ICCTA defines "transportation" broadly to include locomotives and equipment related to movement; regulation need not occur during actual motion | Court: The ICCTA covers locomotives and related equipment even when not moving; Delaware’s argument is forfeited and substantively fails |
| Whether narrow tailoring and exceptions avoid preemption | Narrow exceptions mean only nonessential idling is restricted; necessary idling remains allowed | Even narrow rules that decide when/where idling is permitted substitute state operational judgments for railroads and manage rail transportation | Court: Narrow tailoring of practical effect is irrelevant to categorical-preemption inquiry; state cannot make operational determinations for railroads |
| Standard of deference owed to STB’s preemption decision | Delaware urged Skidmore (persuasive weight) deference | STB argued Chevron deference is proper for its ICCTA preemption interpretation | Court: Did not decide precise deference level because STB’s conclusion survives either Chevron or Skidmore review |
Key Cases Cited
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (agency preemption determinations get no special Chevron authority absent delegation; agency views get Skidmore weight)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (agency interpretations merit respect proportional to their persuasiveness)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439 (5th Cir.) (state statute limiting when trains may block streets was categorically preempted)
- N.Y. Susquehanna & Western Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (ICCTA preempts state laws that manage or govern rail transportation; incidental effects permitted)
- Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (states retain some police powers but regulations that manage rail transportation are categorically preempted)
- Ass’n of American Railroads v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 622 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (state rules that directly and exclusively apply to railroad activity and govern operations are preempted)
- Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing incidental state rules from those that manage train operations)
- Fayus Enterprises v. BNSF Ry. Co., 602 F.3d 444 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing agency deference limits on preemption determinations)
- New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2008) (categorical-preemption focus is on the act of regulation, not particular factual effects)