Delaney v. First Fin. of Charleston, Inc., 829 S.E.2d 249

In 2007 Delaney bought a truck; the retail installment contract was assigned to First Financial, which took a UCC security interest. After Delaney defaulted, First Financial repossessed the truck.
First Financial sent a "Notice of Private Sale of Collateral" on May 2, 2008. It sold the truck on December 15, 2008.
Delaney sued on October 3, 2011 (within three years of sale but more than three years after notice), alleging Article 9 notice noncompliance and seeking the statutory penalty in S.C. Code § 36-9-625(c)(2) as a class representative.
First Financial moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as time-barred; dispute focused on when the cause of action accrued (upon receipt of notice vs. upon disposition) and which limitations period (one vs. three years) controlled.
The trial court and a split Court of Appeals majority held the claim accrued on receipt of the notice and was time-barred; the dissent and Delaney argued accrual was upon disposition. This Court granted certiorari.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does an Article 9 claim for deficient notice of disposition accrue?	Accrues when secured party disposes of the collateral; notice may be revised before disposition so accrual should be at sale.	Accrues when the allegedly deficient notice is received; limitations should run from notice.	Accrual is upon disposition of the collateral (date of sale).
Which statute of limitations applies to the statutory penalty claim?	Three-year statute for an action upon a statute for a penalty given to the aggrieved party.	Argued one- or three-year; at oral argument respondent conceded three years.	Three-year limitations period under S.C. Code § 15-3-540(2) applies.
Does availability of pre-disposition injunctive relief mean the penalty claim accrues earlier?	N/A (Delaney relied on disposition date).	Argued injunctive remedy shows plaintiff could sue before disposition, so penalty claim accrues at notice.	Rejected: different statutory language and narrow construction of penalties mean accrual for penalty claim is at disposition.
May a secured party amend a defective notice before disposition and avoid penalty?	Not decided by the Court; Official Comment allows revision and sufficiency is assessed at disposition.	N/A	Court notes revision is permitted and sufficiency is assessed as of disposition but does not decide effect of amendment on penalty liability.

Fabian v. Lindsay, 410 S.C. 475 (S.C. 2014) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6)).
Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 S.C. 569 (S.C. 2005) (treating well-pled allegations as true on 12(b)(6)).
Town of Summerville v. City of North Charleston, 378 S.C. 107 (S.C. 2008) (questions of law reviewed de novo).
Gordon v. Phillips Utilities, Inc., 362 S.C. 403 (S.C. 2005) (courts adhere to statutory language; do not rewrite statutes).
Wallace v. Wannamaker, 231 S.C. 158 (S.C. 1957) (statutory penalties construed narrowly).
Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2009) (specific statute controls over more general limitations provision).
Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 333 S.C. 33 (S.C. 1998) (three-year limitations applied where aggrieved parties sued under consumer statute).
Montjoy v. One Stop of Abbeville, Inc., 325 S.C. 17 (S.C. 1996) (one-year limitations applied to third-party prosecution of penalty).