DeKalb County v. U.S. Department of Labor, 812 F.3d 1015

Daisy Abdur‑Rahman and Ryan Petty were probationary DeKalb County compliance inspectors who sought historical sewer‑spill records and raised concerns about enforcement; supervisors resisted and relations soured.
County supervisors recommended termination based on perceived insubordination, poor fit with workplace culture, and supervisory difficulties; both employees were fired in March 2005.
Employees filed OSHA complaints under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) alleging retaliatory termination for protected whistleblowing; OSHA found no violation but an ALJ held a 13‑day hearing.
The ALJ found the employees engaged in protected activity but concluded that the protected activity was not the motivating factor and dismissed the complaints; the Administrative Review Board (Board) reversed on legal grounds, holding the protected activity was a motivating factor and that the employer failed to show it would have made the same decision absent that activity.
The County petitioned for review, arguing the Board erred by applying de novo review to factual findings (rather than the required substantial‑evidence standard) and challenging the Board’s motivating‑factor and burden‑shifting analysis.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed the Board used the wrong standard for factual review but held the error was harmless because the Board reversed only on legal issues (motivating‑factor and Mt. Healthy / Price Waterhouse burden‑shifting), so the petition was denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standard of review applied by Board to ALJ factual findings	Board applied de novo; Abdur‑Rahman/Petty argued Board was correct to reverse on legal grounds	County argued Board should have used substantial‑evidence review and its de novo review invalidates reversal	Court: Parties agree Board used wrong standard, but error harmless because reversal was based on legal conclusions; no remand needed
Whether employees engaged in FWPCA‑protected activity	Employees: repeatedly sought spill records and voiced good‑faith compliance concerns — protected even if incorrect	County: contested that activity was not protected or lacked good faith	Court: Substantial evidence supports that they engaged in protected activity
Whether protected activity was a motivating factor and burden allocation	Employees: protected activity was a motivating factor; once shown burden shifts to employer to prove it would have fired them anyway	County: argued adverse action was for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons and ALJ correctly required 'motivating factor' standard	Court: Board correctly applied motivating‑factor (mixed‑motive) framework and held County failed to prove it would have made same decision absent protected activity; ALJ misapplied legal standard

Stone & Webster Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 684 F.3d 1127 (11th Cir. 2012) (Board must review ALJ factual findings under substantial‑evidence standard)
Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568 (11th Cir. 1997) (FWPCA protects informal/internal complaints made in good faith)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency deference in statutory interpretation)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed‑motive framework for motivation and allocation of burdens)
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (employer may avoid relief by proving it would have taken same action absent protected conduct)
Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993) (risk of merging lawful and unlawful motives falls on employer)
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (definition of substantial evidence)
Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2015) (appellate review under substantial‑evidence standard)