204 Conn.App. 665
Conn. App. Ct.2021Background
- On December 9, 2013 Jose DeJesus was injured at R.P.M. Enterprises, Inc. (R.P.M.) when a car fell on him while he worked at R.P.M.’s junkyard; he did not file a written notice of claim within one year.
- At the scene Marion (owner) directed that DeJesus be placed on a mattress and, through agent Russell Adams, be driven to a hospital; Marion later paid for a wheelchair, a ramp, and weekly payments to DeJesus.
- Proceedings were bifurcated: the commissioner decided jurisdiction first (2017 decision), finding the medical-care exception tolled the one-year notice requirement and that DeJesus was an employee of R.P.M.; the Compensation Review Board affirmed (DeJesus I).
- A later hearing (2019) on compensability (record incorporated from 2017) resulted in a finding DeJesus sustained a compensable, catastrophic injury; the commissioner held R.P.M. and Marion alter egos and made Marion jointly and severally liable; the board affirmed in part (DeJesus II).
- On appeal to the Appellate Court, the court held collateral estoppel did not apply but the law-of-the-case doctrine did; it affirmed jurisdiction and compensability findings but reversed the parts holding Marion personally liable and the piercing of R.P.M.’s corporate veil because the commissioner lacked statutory authority to pierce the veil or enter personal liability against a non‑named employer.
Issues
| Issue | DeJesus's Argument | R.P.M./Marion's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prior board decision (DeJesus I) precluded relitigation by collateral estoppel | DeJesus: failure to appeal made DeJesus I final; issues decided there are precluded | R.P.M./Marion: DeJesus I was interlocutory because proceedings were bifurcated and compensability remained to be decided | Collateral estoppel did not apply; law of the case did — board correctly relied on prior findings as law of the case but erred applying collateral estoppel |
| Whether the medical-care exception (§ 31-294c(c)) tolled the one‑year notice requirement | DeJesus: employer/agent transported him to hospital and furnished medical care, so exception applies | R.P.M./Marion: mere transport is insufficient and they lacked notice of the injury | Exception applied: commissioner and board reasonably found employer/agent furnished care and had notice, tolling the deadline |
| Whether DeJesus was an employee (not an independent contractor) of R.P.M. | DeJesus: testimony showed control, set schedule, employer tools, daily cash pay — indicia of employment | R.P.M./Marion: independent contractor agreement and claims of lack of control | Board properly deferred to commissioner’s credibility findings; employment finding stands (defendants failed to file motion to correct factual findings) |
| Whether commissioner could pierce corporate veil and hold Marion personally liable without DeJesus naming Marion as employer | DeJesus/fund: Marion was alter ego; commissioner may treat Marion as personally liable to protect claimant/fund | R.P.M./Marion: no notice, no statutory grant allowing commissioner to pierce veil or impose personal liability on a non‑named party | Reversed as to Marion: commissioner lacked jurisdiction under the Act to pierce the corporate veil or enter personal liability; fund must use § 31-355(c) civil action to seek reimbursement and veil-piercing relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607 (Conn. 1947) (employer-authorized medical treatment can satisfy the medical-care exception to notice requirement)
- Pernacchio v. New Haven, 63 Conn. App. 570 (Conn. App. 2001) (transportation to hospital by employer emergency personnel and subsequent hospital testing can satisfy the medical-care exception)
- Infante v. Mansfield Construction Co., 47 Conn. App. 530 (Conn. App. 1998) (sending an employee to a physician through an authorized agent constitutes furnishing medical treatment)
- Tianti v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 231 Conn. 690 (Conn. 1995) (the right to control the means and methods of work distinguishes employee from independent contractor)
- Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., 248 Conn. 754 (Conn. 1999) (commissioner’s jurisdiction is limited to claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act)
- Dechio v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 376 (Conn. 2010) (explains statutory framework for Second Injury Fund payments and fund’s later civil action to recover payments)
- Levarge v. General Dynamics Corp., 282 Conn. 386 (Conn. 2007) (final judgment requirement for appeals; interlocutory decisions are not appealable)