53 A.2d 392 | Conn. | 1947
The defendants' appeal from an award of compensation for frostbite was dismissed by the Superior Court. They appeal on the grounds that the statutory notice was not given, that the injury did not arise out of the employment and that *609 no causal connection between the injury and the plaintiff's disability was established.
The finding, as corrected by the commissioner, may be summarized as follows: The plaintiff was employed as a clerk by the named defendant, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. On the afternoon of December 31, 1943, no other driver was available and the defendant's superintendent sent the plaintiff with a loaded truck from Groton to Montowese. His truck was not equipped with a heater. The floor boards of the cab were broken and it was cold and drafty. It was a cold day and the temperature range was between 44 and 27 degrees. The plaintiff left Groton about 3:30 p.m., reached Montowese about 6 p.m., waited about an hour and a half and reached Groton on his return about 10 p.m. He was very cold on the way home and found it necessary to warm his hands by shaking them. When he got out of the truck on his return he felt that his feet were frozen and so reported to the watchman and superintendent The next day was a holiday and the following day Sunday, so he did not report for work until Monday, January 3, 1944. At that time he reported to the superintendent that his feet were bothering him and the latter told him to consult Dr. Hewes, who attended injured employees of the defendant. Dr. Hewes made a diagnosis of frostbite and gave him instruction to follow. His condition did not improve. He continued to work and consulted various physicians, one of whom told him he might have an early Buerger's disease. He then went to the Lahey Clinic on June 8, 1944, which made a diagnosis that the disease was possibly present in an early form. The treatment recommended gave no relief. In November, 1945, the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Hildenbrand *610 of Washington, D.C., who made a diagnosis of a vasomotor disturbance of the causalgic type, probably related to his frostbite. He advised the plaintiff to stop work and the latter has not worked since. The plaintiff filed no written notice of claim for compensation or hearing within the year, nor was any hearing assigned or voluntary agreement entered into within that time. His failure to take these steps, although he was the clerk who would ordinarily file reports of compensable accidents, was due to the fact that in the beginning he did not believe his injury to be serious and that the later diagnosis of a possible Buerger's disease created a doubt that he had a compensable injury. The defendant insurer had medical examinations made of the plaintiff but the results were not introduced in evidence.
On these facts the commissioner concluded that the treatment by Dr. Hewes under the circumstances described dispensed with the necessity for written notice, that the plaintiff's ride exposed him to the danger of frostbite to a greater degree than the general public and that the injury was a frostbite of both feet which arose out of and in the course of his employment.
The importance of securing a correction of this finding was obvious to the defendant, and findings as to causation, based on the medical testimony, and as to notice were specifically attacked. The finding is further corrected by adding the undisputed facts that the plaintiff paid Dr. Hewes for his visit and that Dr. Hewes made no report of the visit or of his diagnosis. Otherwise, the evidence either directly or by reasonable inference supports the finding. Stulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co.,
Written notice of the injury within one year is necessary to give the commissioner jurisdiction to hear the claim unless the case falls within one of the exceptions stated in the statute. General Statutes, Cum. Sup. 1935, 1613c; Walsh v. Waldron Sons,
This particular exception has not been construed in Connecticut. Beyond the rule of liberal construction with which the rights of the employee under the statute are treated (Caldwell v. United States *612
Aluminum Co.,
It would serve no useful purpose to enter into a detailed discussion of the evidence for the purpose of supporting the conclusion of the commissioner that the plaintiff was, at the time of the hearing, suffering from the results of the frostbite sustained by him on December 31, 1943. The claim of the defendant that the commissioner could not find that the plaintiff's feet were frozen on that evening is without merit. He has suffered continuously since that time and no other intervening cause of his condition has been proved. Dr. Hildenbrand attributes his present condition to the frostbite, possibly complicated by a circulatory disturbance which would make him more susceptible thereto. LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co.,
The question remains: Did the injury arise out of the employment? It so happens that the early leading Connecticut case defining that phrase was also a frostbite case. Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
The refusal of the trial court to sustain the appeal from the commissioner was correct.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.