Dejana v. Dejana
168 A.3d 595
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Wendy Dejana moved for postjudgment contempt alleging Michael Dejana underpaid unallocated alimony and child support from 2010–2013 by failing to include income from his employer’s long‑term incentive plan (LTIP) in the calculation.
- The separation agreement (incorporated into the dissolution judgment) required Michael to pay 40% of base salary and 30% of any bonus as unallocated alimony/child support (reduced later by agreement), and separately required him to pay the child’s four‑year college costs.
- Article VII, ¶7.1 (Educational Expenses) expressly authorized Michael to use his LTIP (vested value identified) to pay the son’s college expenses.
- Michael used LTIP funds (net ~$225,746) and other sources to pay approximately $235,021 in college costs for the son; plaintiff sought a share (30% or 40%) of LTIP income as additional support.
- Trial court found the separation agreement unambiguous: LTIP funds were reserved for college expenses and thus excluded from the bonus calculation in Article VIII; it denied contempt. Plaintiff appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the claim that 30% of LTIP income was owed preserved for appeal? | Claim of unpaid arrearage based on including LTIP as bonus (30% or 40%) was argued at trial and preserved. | Plaintiff asserted new theory on appeal; defendant urged it was not preserved. | Preserved — trial court had considered the alternative theory; appellate review permitted. |
| Does “bonus” in Article VIII include LTIP income for calculating support? | "Bonus" should be interpreted broadly to include LTIP as additional compensation, so 30% of LTIP was owed. | The agreement separately and specifically allocated LTIP funds to college payments in Article VII, excluding them from Article VIII bonus calculation. | "Bonus" does not include LTIP here; Article VII unambiguously reserved LTIP for college, so LTIP excluded from support calculation. |
| Was the separation agreement ambiguous such that extrinsic evidence or fact findings were required? | Plaintiff contended different reasonable interpretations exist, making the contract ambiguous. | Language of Article VII is clear and specific; contract must be enforced as written. | Contract was unambiguous; no further factual findings required; court applied plain terms. |
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying contempt? | Plaintiff claimed underpayment and sought arrearage including LTIP share. | Defendant complied with Article VIII as LTIP was not part of bonus; he used LTIP to pay college per Article VII. | No abuse of discretion; contempt properly denied because defendant complied with the agreement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345 (preservation of issues and appellate review principles in family law context)
- State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400 (trial by ambuscade and the requirement that claims be raised at trial)
- Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370 (separation agreement interpreted as contract; rules for construing agreements)
- Nation-Bailey v. Bailey, 316 Conn. 182 (contract ambiguity principles and interpreting contract as whole)
- Flaherty v. Flaherty, 120 Conn. App. 266 (plenary review when contract interpretation presents question of law)
- Fazio v. Fazio, 162 Conn. App. 236 (ambiguity in separation agreement requires trial court fact findings on parties’ intent)
- R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448 (give operative effect to every contract provision; read provisions together)
- Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., 111 Conn. App. 287 (definition and scope of the term "bonus" in compensation contexts)