Deeds Ex Rel. Renzulli v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Center
110 A.3d 1009
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- Niajah Deeds (a minor) sued HUP and the Trustees alleging failure to diagnose her mother with preeclampsia on Jan. 18, 2001, leading to placental abruption and severe birth injuries. Trial occurred in Oct.–Nov. 2013; jury returned a defense verdict. Post-trial motions were denied and Deeds appealed.
- After day one of trial parties had stipulated that treating providers were agents of HUP; Deeds moved to dismiss the Trustees but the court refused, allowing separate counsel for HUP and the Trustees to continue. Only HUP appeared on the verdict sheet.
- During trial, defense counsel (for the Trustees) elicited testimony and argued that Deeds’ care and future medical costs were covered by Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act. Objections were sustained at times, but no curative instruction was given.
- Deeds objected to the Trustees’ separate and active participation (multiple openings/closings, examinations), arguing duplication and prejudice; the trial court found the objection waived and allowed both counsel to participate.
- Deeds also challenged admission of testimony by Dr. Parry (attending on Jan. 20) as improper expert opinion about care on Jan. 18; the court admitted him as a fact witness. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial on other grounds but affirmed the admission of Dr. Parry’s testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense comments and testimony about government benefits violated the collateral source rule and required a new trial | Deeds: Trustees improperly informed jury that Medicaid/ACA covered her care, which prejudiced liability determination; collateral source evidence tainted verdict | Defendants: Any references were harmless; objections were sustained; damages issue only arises if liability found | Court: Violation of collateral source rule was prejudicial to liability; ink-in-the-milk analogy—new trial required |
| Whether the court erred by allowing separate counsel for HUP and the Trustees to actively participate despite stipulation | Deeds: Multiple defense lawyers gave duplicative examination and separate closing arguments despite same interest, leading to prejudice | Defendants: Trustees remained a party (coverage issues); objection was untimely/waived; separate representation permissible | Court: Trial court abused discretion by permitting two defense advocates to "tag team"; this contributed to prejudice and supports new trial |
| Whether Dr. Parry improperly testified as an undisclosed expert about care on Jan. 18 | Deeds: Parry opined about whether mother had preeclampsia on Jan. 18 without being identified as an expert or producing an expert report | Defendants: Parry treated the mother and relied on records; his testimony was fact-based and within his observations | Court: Testimony deemed fact-based, rationally grounded in Parry’s perceptions and admissible without expert designation; no relief warranted on this claim |
| Whether trial court’s denial of new trial was an abuse of discretion overall | Deeds: Cumulative errors (collateral source violations, duplicative defense representation, undisclosed expert) warranted new trial | Defendants: Errors were harmless or waived; no reversible error | Court: Reversed and remanded for new trial based principally on collateral-source violations and improper dual-defense participation; Parry ruling left intact |
Key Cases Cited
- Nigra v. Walsh, 797 A.2d 353 (Pa. Super. 2002) (improper collateral source evidence may require new trial)
- Beechwoods Flying Service, Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 476 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1984) (purpose of collateral source rule)
- Lobalzo v. Varoli, 185 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1962) (erroneous collateral-source evidence can be incurably prejudicial)
- Burish v. Digon, 206 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1965) (trial court authority to limit number/participation of counsel with common interests)
- Poust v. Hylton, 940 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2007) (assessment of prejudicial counsel remarks and need for curative measures)
- Polett v. Public Communs., Inc., 83 A.3d 205 (Pa. Super. 2013) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings and expert testimony)
- Brady by Brady v. Ballay, 704 A.2d 1076 (Pa. Super. 1997) (fact testimony may include opinion if rationally based on witness perceptions)
- Maya v. Johnson & Johnson & McNeil-PPC, Inc., 97 A.3d 1203 (Pa. Super. 2014) (standard for reviewing denial of new trial)