Deck v. Jenkins
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2316
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Defendant Stephen Deck (46) chatted online with a decoy who posed as a 13‑year‑old and arranged a meeting; he traveled to the rendezvous and was arrested with a camera, MapQuest directions, condoms, and a piece of pie (used by Deck as sexual euphemism).
- Deck was convicted in California of attempted lewd or lascivious act on a child; the jury was instructed on the California attempt standard (must take an immediate/direct step beyond preparation).
- In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor repeatedly argued (incorrectly) that Deck could be guilty even if the alleged sexual act would occur at some unspecified future time ("next day, next week, two weekends"). Defense did not object.
- The jury sent a note asking whether the defendant had to do anything ‘‘that day’’ or could merely ‘‘put it into play’’; deliberations were recessed and later restarted with a substitute juror; the trial court invited further questions but the jury returned a guilty verdict without resubmitting the note.
- The California Court of Appeal found the prosecutor misstated the law but held the error harmless because (1) the misstatement was an isolated departure from a correct theme, (2) the trial court gave correct instructions which jurors are presumed to follow, and (3) the evidence of intent to touch that night was sufficient. The Ninth Circuit reversed on habeas, concluding the error was prejudicial; separate dissents argued the panel failed to give AEDPA deference consistent with Davis v. Ayala.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Deck) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor’s misstatement of the legal temporal element of attempt violated due process | Prosecutor’s misstatements undermined the central defense and so infected the trial with unfairness (Darden); jury confusion shown by note, and instructions did not address the temporal issue | Error was isolated, jury was properly instructed on attempt, and jurors are presumed to follow instructions; evidence supported intent to touch that night | Majority: misstatement violated due process; CCA’s harmlessness determination was unreasonable and the error caused actual prejudice under Brecht; relief granted on habeas |
| Standard of review on federal habeas where state court found harmless error: must Brecht alone suffice, or must federal court also apply AEDPA/Chapman deference? | Brecht’s ‘‘actual prejudice’’ test suffices and subsumes AEDPA limitations; a finding of actual prejudice means the state court’s contrary harmlessness finding is necessarily unreasonable | Where a state court has adjudicated the claim on the merits, AEDPA requires that a federal court defer unless the state decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent (Chapman/AEDPA) | Majority: applied Brecht and concluded actual prejudice; concurrence/dissent: emphasized Davis v. Ayala and Harrington require §2254(d) deference and that Brecht does not eliminate the Chapman/AEDPA precondition; dissent would rehear en banc |
| Whether the California Court of Appeal’s harmlessness ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (AEDPA §2254(d)) | CCA unreasonably minimized the scope and centrality of the prosecutorial error and the absence of corrective instruction; no fair‑minded jurist could agree | CCA reasonably concluded the misstatement was isolated, instructions cured any error, and evidence was strong | Majority: CCA’s decision was objectively unreasonable; dissent: CCA’s conclusion was within fairminded disagreement and AEDPA forbids reversal |
| Remedy on habeas when error is prejudicial | Grant relief (new trial) unless state elects to retry | Oppose relief given AEDPA deference and view that error was harmless | Court reversed district court and remanded with instruction to grant relief unless state grants new trial; dissent would deny relief under AEDPA |
Key Cases Cited
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutorial misconduct violates due process only if it "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process")
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (on collateral review habeas relief requires a showing of "actual prejudice"—a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict)
- Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (when a state court adjudicated a claim on the merits, federal habeas courts must account for AEDPA deference; Brecht does not by itself eliminate the Chapman/AEDPA precondition)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (federal courts must consider arguments that could have supported the state court’s decision; unreasonable application standard is high)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (on direct review, federal constitutional trial errors require reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (arguments of counsel generally carry less weight than jury instructions and must be judged in context)
- Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (jury is presumed to follow accurate instructions; failure to seek further clarification does not necessarily show confusion)