Dechio v. Raymark Industries, Inc.
10 A.3d 20
| Conn. | 2010Background
- The Second Injury Fund participated in Raymark's workers' compensation proceedings over many years, including hearings on compensability and insurance coverage.
- A 2005 finding and award (Sept. 30, 2005) upheld the June 24, 1988 compensability finding, rejected coverage by carriers, and set a benefits rate, with Raymark initially responsible subject to bankruptcy stay.
- Raymark's bankruptcy delayed further proceedings; relief from the stay allowed pursuing payments from Raymark or fund later, and in 2006 the commissioner issued a finding directing Raymark to pay benefits and ratified earlier findings for the fund’s potential liability.
- On Oct. 25, 2006, the commissioner issued a supplemental order directing the fund to pay benefits pursuant to § 31-355; the fund petitioned for board review, which was dismissed as untimely, a ruling upheld by the Appellate Court.
- The pivotal issue was whether the twenty-day appeal period under § 31-301(a) runs from the original award/findings or from the supplemental order, given the fund's participation in prior proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does §31-301(a)'s twenty-day period start for a fund that participated earlier? | Dechio argues period begins on the award establishing the fund's liability (Sept. 30, 2005). | Raymark and carriers contend period begins after a §31-355(b) order directing payment. | Fund's period begins with the Sept. 30, 2005 award establishing probable liability. |
| Is §31-355(b) applicable to determine the appeal period in cases where the fund participated from the start? | Matey-like argument that fund had no need for extra hearing and §31-355(b) not controlling here. | Fund argues §31-355(b) controls timing because it directs payment from the fund after contested liability. | §31-355(b) is inapplicable when the fund participated; timing governed by §31-301(a). |
| Does the supplemental order trigger a new appeal period or relitigate prior determinations? | Matey and Paranteau-based logic suggest no new appeal period; prior findings remain subject to timely appeal. | Fund contends supplemental order reopens rights to challenge the underlying findings. | The supplemental order did not create a new appeal period; timely appeal must be from earlier decision if preserved. |
| Did the fund preserve its appellate rights under Practice Book §61-5 given participation in the proceedings? | Fund should have preserved rights earlier or relied on the timely earlier appealable decision. | Fund could rely on de facto aggrievement from prior proceedings and ministerial nature of later steps. | Fund failed to preserve rights; board lacked jurisdiction; the dismissal was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Matey v. Estate of Dember, 256 Conn. 456 (2001) (limits §31-355(b) applicability to cases where fund participated)
- Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn. 515 (1988) (bright-line finality of judgments regarding attorney's fees vs merits)
- Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477 (2007) (final judgment concept doesn't apply to board appeals from commissioner decisions)
- Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 346 (2010) (appeal period under §31-301(a) is jurisdictional and nonwaivable)
- Jones v. Redding, 296 Conn. 352 (2010) (standards for reviewing workers' compensation appeals; deference to commissioner/board context)
- Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363 (2005) (aggrievement standard for appellate rights)
- Delucia v. Modena, 12 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 212 (1994) (board preclusion principles guiding finality and timely appeals)