Dechert LLP v. PA DCED, 234 A.3d 911

Dechert LLP leased office space in the Cira Centre located in a KOIZ whose KOZ tax benefits expired on December 31, 2018; Dechert had received nearly 15 years of KOZ benefits there.
Dechert intends to relocate to JFK Towers (3001 JFK Blvd.), a new building in the Schuylkill Yard KOEZ (an active KOZ), and requested confirmation it could receive KOZ benefits at the new location.
DCED issued a Letter Ruling denying Dechert KOZ benefits upon relocation, construing the KOZ Act to bar businesses from moving from an expired zone into an active zone (to prevent “zone-hopping”).
Dechert filed a dual-jurisdiction Petition for Review seeking reversal of the Letter Ruling (Count I) and a declaratory judgment on the statutory meaning (Count II); the Court treated the matter as an original-jurisdiction declaratory-judgment action and an application for summary relief.
The core legal question was whether Section 307(b) of the KOZ Act — which disqualifies businesses that “relocate from outside a subzone … into a subzone” unless they meet enumerated economic criteria — permits relocation from an expired KOZ into an active KOZ.
The Commonwealth Court held DCED’s construction added a prohibition not found in the statute, granted Dechert declaratory relief, dismissed the appellate-count portion, and declared that a move from an expired zone into an active zone is permitted if the business satisfies Section 307(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether "relocate from outside a subzone into a subzone" permits moving from an expired zone into an active zone	Section 307(b) is plain: relocating from an expired KOZ is relocating "from outside" and thus permitted if one meets the statute's criteria	DCED: statute’s silence regarding expired→active moves should be read as a prohibition to prevent zone‑hopping and preserve temporary relief policy	Court: Statute unambiguous; "from outside" includes expired zones; DCED may not add a prohibition not in the statute; relocation is allowed if Section 307(b) is satisfied
Whether DCED's Letter Ruling was a final adjudication appealable to the Court	Dechert treated the Letter Ruling as an adjudication and appealed it	DCED disputed that the Letter Ruling was a final adjudication subject to appellate review	Court: Letter Ruling not treated as a final adjudication for appellate jurisdiction here; appellate count dismissed and declaratory relief granted in original jurisdiction

Eleven Eleven Pa., LLC v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 169 A.3d 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (declaratory relief appropriate when declaration will resolve imminent dispute)
Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 8 A.3d 866 (Pa. 2010) (DJA permits declaration of statutory meaning)
Pa. Fin. Resp. Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 664 A.3d 84 (Pa. 1995) (clear statutory language governs legislative intent)
Lancaster Cty. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 94 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2014) (agency interpretations receive little weight when statute is unambiguous)
Com. v. Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262 (Pa. 2016) (courts must consider what a statute does not say)
E. Coast Vapor, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue, 189 A.3d 504 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (courts may not add terms to a statute under guise of interpretation)
Harmon v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 207 A.3d 292 (Pa. 2019) (administrative agency exceeds authority when it departs from statutory text)
Vetri Navy Yard, LLC v. Department of Community & Economic Development, 189 A.3d 1137 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (discussing KOZ-related relocation and recapture issues)