Debra Chris Montgomery Kroupa Williams v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp, Robert W. Williams
2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8638
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Kroupa and Williams lived together and were later adjudicated common-law spouses; the divorce decree awarded Kroupa the Meadow Road homestead.
- On August 21, 2002 Williams obtained a $154,000 home equity loan from World Savings Bank and signed loan documents representing he was an "unmarried man;" Kroupa did not sign the loan documents and disputes when she learned of the loan (she says ~one month later).
- Kroupa sued (Sept. 22, 2008) to remove a cloud on title and to quiet title, claiming the home equity lien was void because she neither signed nor consented, invoking Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(A).
- Wachovia (successor to World Savings) and Williams moved for partial summary judgment, asserting the residual four‑year statute of limitations (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.051) bars the suit and alternatively asserting judicial estoppel and ratification.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment finding Kroupa’s claim barred by limitations, judicial estoppel, and ratification; the court later entered final judgment and awarded fees to Williams.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 4‑year residual statute of limitations bars Kroupa’s action to remove a home‑equity lien | Kroupa: lien is void (no spouse consent) so equitable action to remove cloud on title is not subject to limitations | Wachovia/Williams: claim accrued when loan was made or when Kroupa discovered it; §16.051 applies and suit is time‑barred | The court held §16.051 applies; Kroupa’s suit filed in 2008 was beyond four years of accrual and is barred |
| Whether a home‑equity lien lacking the non‑signing spouse’s consent is void or voidable | Kroupa: lack of spouse consent makes lien void ab initio, so cure provisions cannot validate it | Defs: cure provision in §50(a)(6)(Q) makes such defects voidable; lien can be cured | Court held defects are voidable (cure provision applies); thus limitations can run |
| Accrual date for limitations (when cause of action accrued) | Kroupa: (argues) suit not barred because lien void; accrual dispute | Defs: accrual when loan closed (Aug 21, 2002) or when Kroupa learned (Sept 2002) | Court applied legal‑injury rule; accrual occurred by Sept 2002 at latest; suit filed 2008 is untimely |
| Whether other affirmative defenses (judicial estoppel, ratification) needed adjudication after limitations ruling | Kroupa: challenges trial court’s other bases for summary judgment | Defs: also relied on estoppel and ratification | Court did not reach these issues because limitations disposition was dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Doody v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001) (holds §50(a)(6)(Q)(x) is a cure provision applicable to §50(a)(6) generally)
- Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, 262 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (applies the four‑year residual limitations period to constitutional home‑equity claims)
- Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2013) (concludes §50(a)(6) defects are voidable because cure provision exists and limitations applies)
- Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2007) (equitable actions to remove cloud on title are not time‑barred only when the instrument is void, not merely voidable)