983 N.W.2d 373
Mich.2022Background
- Parties entered a 2008 consent divorce judgment awarding plaintiff (Deborah Foster) 50% of defendant Ray Foster’s disposable military retired pay and an "offset" clause obligating Ray to pay any reduction to her share if he elected increased disability benefits.
- In 2010 Ray elected increased disability benefits including Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC), which reduced his disposable retired pay and cut plaintiff’s monthly share from about $800 to $200; he did not pay the offset difference.
- Plaintiff sought contempt/enforcement in state court; trial court ordered compliance and later held Ray in contempt when he failed to pay; Ray appealed, arguing CRSC and disability pay are not divisible under federal law.
- Michigan courts (trial court and Court of Appeals) initially enforced the consent judgment; this Court in Foster I held the offset provision conflicted with federal law but left open whether Ray could collaterally attack the consent judgment.
- In this opinion the Michigan Supreme Court holds that federal preemption under 10 U.S.C. §1408 and 38 U.S.C. §5301 does not strip state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce property divisions; the offset provision was an error in the exercise of jurisdiction but not void, so collateral attack is improper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Foster) | Defendant's Argument (Foster) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant may collaterally attack the consent-judgment offset that conflicts with federal law | The consent judgment is final; res judicata bars collateral attack and the judgment should be enforced | The offset conflicts with federal law (disability/CRSC not divisible) and thus is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, permitting collateral attack | Collateral attack is improper; the offset was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction but not void, so res judicata bars collateral challenge |
| Whether federal preemption deprives state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over dividing military retirement/disability benefits | State courts retain jurisdiction over domestic relations; federal preemption does not automatically oust state courts | Federal statutes governing VA/DoD benefits preempt state law and vest exclusive control in federal forums, depriving state courts of jurisdiction | Preemption does not deprive state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction absent a congressional grant of exclusive federal forum; state courts retain jurisdiction over divorce/property disputes |
| Whether res judicata applies to a divorce decree that divides military benefits even if later held preempted | Res judicata applies to final divorce property settlements; such judgments cannot be collaterally attacked merely because they rested on an erroneous legal premise | The judgment is void because it exceeded lawful authority under federal law, so res judicata should not shield it | Res judicata applies; a final divorce decree dividing benefits is generally enforceable and not subject to collateral attack absent fraud or lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction over benefit-division disputes in federal agencies/courts (e.g., VA Secretary, Veterans Court) | No; statutes giving the Secretary authority to decide benefits do not displace state courts or create an exclusive forum for divorce property division | Yes; 38 U.S.C. provisions and VA review scheme create an exclusive federal channel, so state-court enforcement conflicts with federal control | No exclusive federal forum exists for adjudicating the division of military disability benefits in divorce; federal statutes do not strip state courts of jurisdiction in this context |
Key Cases Cited
- Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (U.S. 2017) (U.S. Supreme Court decision on nondivisibility of certain VA benefits and relevance to state division of military pay)
- Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1987) (federal preemption of domestic-relations laws requires a clear congressional command; state courts traditionally govern domestic relations)
- Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (U.S. 1989) (federal substantive law may control division of military pensions but res judicata is a matter of state law)
- McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (U.S. 1981) (historical antecedent on division of military retirement pre-ERISA/legislative changes; background in federal-state conflict analysis)
- Jackson City Bank & Trust Co. v. Fredrick, 271 Mich. 538 (Mich. 1935) (distinguishes want of jurisdiction from erroneous exercise of jurisdiction)
- Buczkowski v. Buczkowski, 351 Mich. 216 (Mich. 1958) (state-law rule that erroneous exercise of jurisdiction yields judgments vulnerable only to direct appeal, not collateral attack)
- In re Ferranti, 504 Mich. 1 (Mich. 2019) (reiterates that judgments lacking personal or subject-matter jurisdiction are void; otherwise errors are for direct review)