Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276

Background

Deborah (grandmother) filed a petition under Maine’s Grandparents Visitation Act (GVA) seeking visitation/contact (and at one point referenced primary residence) with her grandchild; Corrie (mother) moved to dismiss for lack of standing.
Child lived with Deborah and her husband for the first two years of life; thereafter contact included several days per week, almost every weekend, daycare/afterschool care two days/week with Deborah providing weekday care, and regular Wednesday dinners after school until late 2016.
Deborah alleged Corrie later curtailed contact (beginning ~March 2017) and expressed concerns about Corrie’s boyfriend (a convicted sex offender); Corrie submitted affidavits describing supervision by probation/therapist and Department of Health and Human Services involvement.
The District Court dismissed Deborah’s petition for lack of standing, reasoning Deborah had not made a prima facie showing of de facto parentage and therefore lacked standing under the GVA.
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed: (1) Deborah failed to show standing under the GVA’s “sufficient existing relationship/urgent reason” standard, and (2) she also failed to satisfy the more stringent statutory de facto‑parent standards.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Lamkin)	Defendant's Argument (Corrie)	Held
Whether Deborah had statutory standing under the GVA to pursue visitation	Deborah argued her long, regular contact (co-residence first 2 years; routine weekday/weekend care for years; emergency contact; parenting consultation) establishes a "sufficient existing relationship"/"extraordinary contact" constituting an "urgent reason"	Corrie argued Deborah’s contact was intermittent/grandparent-typical, not extraordinary; she disputed safety concerns and showed probation/therapy oversight of boyfriend	Court: Deborah did not meet GVA standing—her contact was intermittent and not the kind of "urgent reason" permitting intrusion on a fit parent’s rights; safety concerns were found addressed by Corrie’s steps.
Whether the trial court properly applied de facto-parentage standards (and whether Deborah met those standards)	Deborah contended the case was brought under the GVA and the trial court wrongly applied the de facto‑parent test; alternatively, she argued her relationship exceeded typical grandparent contact	Corrie relied on de facto-parent elements to show Deborah did not qualify as a de facto parent (no consistent caretaking, no parental acknowledgment, no acceptance of full parental responsibilities)	Court: Trial court applied de facto‑parent framework but, even construing submissions as raising de facto‑parent claims, Deborah failed to satisfy the statutory elements; and failure to meet GVA standing forecloses meeting the higher de facto standard.
Whether appellate court should remand for application of the proper GVA standard	Deborah (and dissent) argued the trial court used the wrong test and should be required to reassess standing under the Robichaud/"extraordinary contact" GVA standard or that, as a matter of law, her affidavits meet that standard	Corrie argued the record supports dismissal on standing grounds and that the District Court appropriately resolved contested factual points	Court: Majority rejected remand—concluded as a matter of law the record was insufficient to establish GVA standing and affirmed dismissal; dissent would remand or find standing.

Key Cases Cited

Philbrook v. Theriault, 957 A.2d 74 (Me. 2008) (standard of review for factual findings supporting standing)
Robichaud v. Pariseau, 820 A.2d 1212 (Me. 2003) (GVA requires "urgent reasons"/"extraordinary contact" to justify intrusion on parental rights)
Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (parental fundamental right; GVA standing safeguards)
Davis v. Anderson, 953 A.2d 1166 (Me. 2008) (noting de facto‑parentage may satisfy GVA "extraordinary contact")
Dorr v. Woodard, 140 A.3d 467 (Me. 2016) (GVA "urgent reason" discussion; only de facto parenthood has been clearly articulated as an urgent reason to date)
Conlogue v. Conlogue, 890 A.2d 691 (Me. 2006) (limitations on GVA intrusion when one parent has died)